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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to make a thorough in-
vestigation of the available sources on the Kennedy admini-
stration's foreign relations with the People's Republic of 
China. In carrying out this inquiry, the primary emphasis 
has been on attempting to make sense of the fragments and 
pieces of information related to the administration. Despite 
the fact that over twenty years have passed, there remains 
a vacuum in regards to a definitive statement on Kennedy's 
attitude towards the Chinese Communists. This study attempts 
to put the policy in a . proper perspective. 
A great deal of relevant material remains classified 
by the State Department and other governmental agencies. 
However, the John F. Kennedy Library in Dorchester, Massachu-
setts proved to be a valuable resource for existing dedassified 
material. Overall, the personal papers of members of the ad-
ministration and other relevant documents emerged as the most 
useful information in the investigation~ In addition to the 
Kennedy Library, declassified documents, published by Carroll-
ton Press were also utilized and added to the study greatly. 
Most secondary sources were either biographies on Kennedy 
or superficial critiques of his administration. These sources 
were found at the University of Rhode Island in Kingston and 
at the Rockefeller Library on the campus of Brown University 
located in Providence, Rhode Island. Due to the nature of 
the secondary sources, the primary documents proved to be the 
essential resources for the research. 
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This investigation has led to certain conclusions. 
Kennedy's actions, in conjunction with the recommendations 
from members of his administration, led to a policy towards 
Peking that maintained the tense relations of the previous 
administration. There was a lack of preparation, understanding, 
and foresight on Keneedy's part. Instead of thinking of the 
future, he chose to ignore alternatives that could have bettered 
Sino-American relations. This was illustrated within several 
issues such as the Sino-Soviet split, the United Nations ques-
tion, and the issue of disarmament. When Kennedy looked be-
yond the horizon in regards to the China policy, he failed 
to accept any alternatives that could create better relations. 
In relation to his policy on China, Kennedy was an in-
decisive leader. True, Kennedy was hindered by the China 
Lobby and by the United States• relationship with the Chinese 
Nationalists. However, Kennedy was too willing to use these 
as excuses. 
It is important to keep in mind the clarity that hind-
sight brings to the scholar. Kennedy was dealing with an 
America that remembered China as an ally. However, Kennedy 
did nothing to change this and allowed a stagnant policy to 
continue. 
-
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
John Kennedy's overall foreign policy slowly emerged 
after he was nominated by the Democratic Party in 1960 for 
the Presidency. His foreign policy gave him the image of 
being his own man in terms of foreign relations. More im-
portant to this study, Kennedy ·• s presidential China policy 
began to emerge. In the end, this image of Kennedy being 
his own man was false because the new President actually 
embraced the China policy of his immediate predecessor. 
Pre-Presidential Policy 
As a member of the United States House of Representatives 
from 1946 through 1952, Kennedy had the opportunity to play 
a role in the China issue. When the ~uomintang regime of 
Chiang Kai-shek fell in 1949, the young Congressman from 
Massachusetts had been a harsh critic of the Truman admini-
stration and its policies. In a speech in Salem, Massachusetts 
following the overthrow of Chiang, Kennedy stated that these 
policies caused the regime to collapse under pressure from the 
communist forces, commenting, "what our young men have saved, 
our diplomats and President have frittered away." 1 Although 
' 
1Fo~ter Rhea Dulles, American Policy Toward Communist 
China (New Yorkz Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972), p. 189. 
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he later felt badly about this harsh statement, the speech 
itself was indicatiye of ' Kennedy's posture throughout most 
of the 1950•s in relation to the China question. This posture 
would of course also influence his China policy as President. 
Kennedy was elected to the Senate in 1952, the same year 
as the overwhelming Eisenhower victory, which saw .conservatism 
reemerging in the United States. As Senator, Kennedy rarely 
deviated from the Eisenhower policy towards the Chinese Com-
munists, accepting the Republican theme of non-recognition. 
Included in this policy was the American support of the Chinese 
Nationalists who were exiled on the island of Taiwan under the 
leadership of Chiang. 
Included in Kennedy's support for the Eisenhower policy 
was the Senator's vote for the 1955 "Formosa Resolution", a 
mutual defense agreement between the United States and the 
island of Taiwan. In short, the Senate resolution endorsed 
the treaty, accepting the idea of using American troops to 
protect Taiwan and the offshore islands from possible aggression 
. 2 
from the mainland • . 
The first crisis related to this treaty occured in .1958, 
the so-called "Taiwan Straits" conflict. Kennedy, deviating 
from his previous stance, criticized Eisenhower's plan for mili-
tary operations. On September 18, Kenn~dy, shifting his policy 
somewhat more to the center, declaring that "the weight of 
2 . . China and U.S. Far East Policy, 1945-1967. (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1967), p. 72. 
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military, diplomatic, political, and historical judgement 
woul.d dictate a contrarypolic;y." 3 Kennedy and his Democratic 
allies saw the Republican administration as too willing to use 
American military forces in the Taiwan region. Although Kennedy 
was not in favor of advocating a change in the U.S. policy, 
especially in regard to recognizing the Chinese Communists, he 
was moving somewhat away from the Eisenhower policy. The Sen-
ator constantly spoke of the direct threat the Peking govern-
ment posed to American interests in the Far East, yet he was 
also willing · to criticize the inflexibility of the Eisenhower 
drn . . . 4 a .1.n.1.strat.1.on. In 1957, a year before his public criticism 
of Eisenhower, Kennedy had written an article titled "A Demo-
crat Looks at Foreign Policy ·." In this journal piece the 
Senator was openly critical of the state of American-Sino re-
lations. Kennedy explained that "in Asia our policy has been 
too rigid ••• we must be very careful not to straitjacke _i: our 
policy as a result of ignorance and fail to detect a change 
in the situation when it comes." 5 It is obvious . that Kennedy's 
opinion on China was not black and white. The Senator was un-
willing to completely break from the Eisenhower policy, but ex-
pressed his dislike for its inflexibility. He refused to ad-
3
rbid., p. 17. 
4 Dulles, American Policy Toward Communist China, p. 189. 
5 John F. Kennedy, "A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy 0 • 
Foreign Affairs 30 (Octobei, 1957): 50. 
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vocate a new policy, but looked to alter the Eisen~ower tac-
tics. In the years to come, with his election into the White 
House, this policy, unforttpately, would continue. Kennedy may 
have been critical of some of Eisenhower's inflexible aspects 
in regard to China, but in 1960 Kennedy would continue the 
same policy. 
The mos~ obvious reason for this continuation was Kennedy's 
conservatism in foreign policy. In addition to this, the new 
President refused to accept the reality of the China situation. 
Kennedy, as President, was too cautious and too short-sighted 
to commit himself to a re-evaluation of the American policy, 
allowing the United States and the People's Republic of China 
to remain bitter enemies. Throughout Kennedy's administration, 
these shortcomings would lead to a dismal showing for the Pres-
ident and his administration in relation to the American China 
policy. 
The Administration 
Kennedy's victory in 1960 was no mandate from the Ameri-
can people. His margin of victory, less than one hundred 
fifty thousand votes, played · a significant role in the extent 
to which the new President felt he could move towards a new, 
more flexible China policy. 
Kennedy depended on various administrative and depart-
mental personnel to formulate his administration's foreign 
policy. These selected members proposed, edited, and suggested 
policy ideas, providing Kennedy with opposing viewpoints from 
which to select. In order to understand the Kennedy foreign 
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policy, its evolution and justifications, it is necessary to 
see who, if anyone, was influencing the President on foreign 
policy, especially in relation to the administration's China 
policy. 
Roger Hilsrnan, Assistant secretary of State in the Kennedy 
administration, maintained· in his biography on the Kennedy 
years that the new President believed in streamlining the 
foreign policy process in order to place most o~ the respon-
sibility on the State Department. In relation to this, Hils-
man continued, Kennedy eliminated the Operations Coordination 
Board and relegated the National Security Council to "special 
problems" status. 6 If Hilsrnan was correct in his assessment 
of Kennedy's administrative organization, then it is apparent 
that the Secretary of State would be apportioned an even lar-
ger amount of responsibility than normal. This meant the Sec-
retary would have to be capable of creating and executing 
policy in addition to overseeing the added administrative details. 
Dean Rusk, a little-known individual in 1960, was selected 
by Kennedy to fill this prestigious post. At the time, Rusk 
was Director of the Rockefeller Foundation and had been out 
of government since 1953. In 1960, he was a difficult man to 
label as conservative or liberal; whether he supported the 
status quo or sought to alter American foreign policy. Foster 
Rhea Dulles, in his American Policy Toward Communist China, 
6Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City, New 
york: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967), p. 23. 
-6'-
1949-1969, ma.iltains that Rusk's appointment "strongly 
militated against any shift in our position in the Far East." 7 
Thomas G. Paterson, an expert in diplomatic history, agrees 
with Dulles. Paterson believes Rusk, as well as others in 
the Kennedy administr ·a tion, looked back to the 1940' s and 
l950•s for inspiration and guidance for developing foreign 
policy. This would classify Rusk as a Cold Warrior. 8 
Kennedy was of course interested in Rusk's philosophy 
on foreign relations, but it seems as though something else 
attracted the President-elect to the native Georgian. In 
1960 Rusk had written an article entitled, "The President." 
In the article Rusk concluded that the Chief Executive should 
more or less be his own Secretary of State, formulating his 
own foreign policy. 9 By advocating this policy in public, 
Rusk :_j.nadvertantly promoted himself as Kennedy's Secretary 
appointment. Rusk's theory attracted Kennedy, who also held 
a similar philosophy. 
Other scholars who disagree with the above conclusions 
defend Rusk and maintain that he was not to blame for the 
lack of progress on the China policy. Warren Cohen, in his 
biography of the former Secretary of State, maitained that 
7 Dulles, American Policy Toward Communist China, p. 191. 
8Thomas G. Paterson, "Bearing the Burden: A Critical Look 
at JFK's Foreign Policy" The Virginia Quarterly Review 54 
(Spring, 1978): 197. 
9Dean Rusk, "The President" Foreign Affairs 38 (April, 
1960): 353-369. 
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Kennedy himself was pushing for the militant Eisenhower policy, 
By moving to dominate his administration's policy, Kennedy, 
according to Cohen, tried to use Rusk merely as a figure-
head. In addition to this, Cohen disagreed with both Dulles 
and Paterson on Rusk's foreign policy views, believing the 
Secretary was an open-minded individual when it came to re-
lations with the Chinese Communists. Cohen stated that Rusk 
understood that Eisenhower's policy was wrong since the govern-
ment of Peking was going to be around for a long time. In re-
gard to this, Rusk believed that the Chinese Communists had 
b . . . 10 to e involved in a variety of world affairs. If Cohen's 
interpretation is correct, then Rusk was not the villain within 
the administration as his critics have charged. Rather it was 
Kennedy or other advisors who hedged on creating a new, more 
realistic policy towards Peking. 
Cohen's argument, however, is not quite this simple. 
While his support for Rusk remains throughout his book, he also 
paints a darker picture of Rusk. In 1951 Rusk made a speech 
highly critical of the Peking regime while full of praise for 
the Nationalists. Cohen concluded that Rusk was not willing 
to return to a hard-line policy, but "he did seem to feel a 
· deep hostility towards the Chinese Communi:t.s, stemming from 
the Korean War. 1111 Thus it becomes more difficult to assign 
blame for the administration's China policy. 
10 . 
Warren Cohen, _D_e_a_n_R_u_s_k_ (Totowa, New Jersey: Cooper 
Square Publishers, 1980), p. 94, 163. 
llibid., p. 163. 
, 
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Another author's viewpoint appears as a more logical 
explanation of what actually occured in this relationship be-
tween the President and his Secretary of State. Roger Hilsman 
was a friend and associate to both men, providing a unique 
vantage point from which to evaluate their relationship. 
Hilsman maintained that their relationship soured over time, 
growing colder which hindered the working arrangement and at-
mosphere. Hilsman was convinced that Kennedy wanted Rusk to 
be an ac!:,ive member of the administration. However, he con-
cluded that Rusk's status with Kennedy dropped dramatically 
in April, 1961 when the Secretary failed to take the leader-
h. . . . . 12 sip role during the Bay of Pigs operation. After this, 
Kennedy began to take the lead in formulating policy, dis-
trusting his Secretary of State. This does not mean Rusk was 
completely out of the policy process, rather Hilsman appeared 
to indicate that foreign.policy revolved around the White House 
and not the State ·Department. This indicates Kennedy was more 
to blame for the administration's China policy and its lack 
of flexibility than Rusk and the State Department. 
Another member of the administration who played a signi-
ficant role in the China policy was Adlai E. Stevenson, the 
American Ambassador to the United Nations. Stevenson had long 
professed to close friends his wish for the Secretary of State 
position, but Kennedy passed him over, hoping to avoid criti-
cism from the conservative factions. Also, the two men had 
12 . · 3 Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 4. 
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serious personal · differences. In terms of the China issue, 
Stevenson historically was critical of the Eisenhower policy 
of non-recognition and wrote to Kennedy on several occasions, 
suggesting a policy reevaluation. In November, 1960, a week , 
after the Kennedy victory, the President-elect asked Stevenson 
for a series of policy recommendations on issues that would 
confront the new administration. In this long report, Steven-
son concluded that there was a need to reevaluate the existing 
China policy, moving away from non-recognition and towards a 
policy that would hopefully be a step towards better relations 
with the People's Republic. 13 Stevenson was not content to 
stop there; he a t so wrote _Kennedy•s personal aide, Theodore 
Sorenson, offering suggestions on items to include within the 
Kennedy inaugural address. Stevenson advised Sorenson to in-
clude "per:ha~ s a conditioned hint of re-examination of our 
China policy to advance controlled disarmament and reduce the 
d . . 14 anger of war in Asia." Both Kennedy and Sorenson chose to 
ignore these recommendations, hoping to let the policy stand 
as it did. Always the company man, Stevenson did not push 
for the~e recommendations. Perhaps he was n ot in the position 
to initiate policy re-examinations. His participation would 
increase on the China iss.e, but to what extent is debatable. 
13
stevenson Report, November, 1960. Box 1074, Pre-
Presidential Papers of John F. Kennedy. John F. Kennedy 
Library Archives, Dorchester, Massachusetts. 
14 . . 
Walter Johnson, ed., Pa ers of Adlai E. Stevenson, 
Volume VII, (.Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1977 , 
p. 605. · 
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One other "liberal" in the administration, also with some 
degree of input on the China policy was Under Secretary of 
State Chester Bowles. Bowles, like Stevenson, was passe d_ over 
for the Secretary of State position due to .his foreign policy 
philosophy. Yet Kennedy knew Bowles was an asset to his admin-
istration since he stlS'lgthened Kennedy's position with liberal 
Democrats. Bowles, as did others in the administration, had 
written an article on foreign affairs in the year preceding 
the Kennedy tenure in the White House. This article dealt 
with the China issue and American policy. Advocating that the 
U.S. should look to create a "two-Chinas" policy, Bowles called 
for American acceptance of the existence of the Chinese Com-
munists.15 With this type of philosophy, it is clear to see 
why Kennedy was apprehensive about Chester Bowles. 
These three men would eventually have a great deal of say 
in the administration's policy towards the Chinese Communists. 
Of course, there would be others, such as Walter Rostow, McGeorge 
Bundy, and Roger Hilsman, who would contribute to the policy. 
Ho"8Ter, in 1960 and 1961, these men, Kennedy, Rusk, Stevenson, 
and Bowles,were the focal point of the policy. 
Kennedy's Apprehension 
As the new administration prepared for its entry into 
office, Kennedy had time to take notice of what he believed to 
be opposition to a new, more flexible policy towards the People's 
Republic of China. The first movement of opposition was the 
15 . . 'd d . Chester Bowles, "The Cluna Policy Reconsi ere " Foreign 
Affairs 38 (April, 1960)1 340-352. 
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China Lobby, specifically, the Committee of One Million. 
Organized in 1953~ this pro-Nationalist group began with a 
:i:atition that opposed the admission of the Chinese Communists 
to the United Nations. The organization's goal was to collect 
the signatures of one million Americans and so gave the 
group its name. After this goal was reached, the petition 
was presented to Congress and the Committee of One Million 
disbanded for several years. 16 When Kennedy was elected in 
1960 the leaders of the Committee grew apprehensive, fearing 
that the young President-elect might initiate a new China 
policy. One reason for this anxiety was an Associated Press 
dispatch of December, 1960 quoting Kennedy as "needing twelve 
months to prepare the American people for the People's Re-
public of China's admission to the U.N. 1117 Although this re-
port was never confirmed, it was taken by the Committee as a 
warning. Members of the group began to lobby Congress, others 
wrote Kennedy expressing their views, and the Committee be-
gan to take out advertisements in selected newspapers to try 
and raise the c'onciousness of the American public. Forrest 
Davis and Robert A. Hunter, two members of the Committee, pub-
lished a book during Kennedy's term in office. The book was 
mostly propaganda, including the theme of Kennedy in the midst 
16
china and the U.S. Far East Policy, 1949-1967, 
pp. 24-25. 
17 Stanley D. Bachrack, The Committee of One Million 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 184 
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of an "agonizing _ rea ppr a isa l" of the administration' s China 
policy. 18 The Committee of One Million was not the only mem-
ber of the China Lobby, but as illustrated above, it cer-
tainly was one of the most organized and resourceful groups 
at the time. 
Supporters of Kennedy's China policy concluded that the 
President's hands were tied by - the China Lobby and by the con-
servative members of Congres~. many of whom belonged to such 
groups as the Committee of One Million. In 1961 alone, there 
were fourteen resolutions in the U.S. House of Representatives 
tnat called for the continued support of the Chinese National-
. . . . . 19 ists and th~ non-recognition of the Chinese Communists. If 
Kennedy was looking to a second term in office, he had to keep 
this issue in mind. 
The Kennedy supporters who claimed his hands were tied 
may have overstated their case. Perhaps in 1961 Kennedy did 
face a formidable obstacle in the China Lobby and in Congress; 
however, both were merely .that- . an obstacle that had to be 
dealt with - something Kennedy chose not to do. James c. 
Thomson Jr., a member of the State Department in the l960's, 
correctly points out that Kennedy's victory in 1960 was the 
return of the Democrats to the White House after eight years 
and, Thomson concluded, the reason for the eigh~ year absence 
18 Forrest Davies and Robert A. Hunter, The Red China 
Lobby (New York: Fleet Publishing Corporation, 1963), p. 107. 
19 · . . 201 Bachrack, The Committee of One Million, p. . 
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was due to the previous Democratic administration's Far East 
policy. 20 In short, Thomson stated that Kennedy did not want 
to bring up a sore spot of the party so quickly, and this makes 
sense. However, this argument does not suffice for Kennedy's 
entire tenure ~ 
Another area Kennedy felt apprehensive about was the 
public opinion about foreign policy. The President ~elect 
believed he faced a movement that ran counter to any thoughts 
of creating a new China policy. Kennedy realized that he needed 
a supportive electorate if he wished to change policy. What 
Kennedy did not realize was that he did have the support of 
the American people. The public was not closed-minded on the 
subject of China and those supporters of Kennedy who maintained 
that the public was against recognizing Peking were blind to 
the facts. 21 
On the Eve 
In 1960 and 1961, Kennedy's China policy was muddled. 
The new President had no patience with the ·idea that Taiwan 
represented all of China, but feared · the domestic political 
liabilities that could arise if he changed policy. 22 He •Con-
20 James C. Thomson Jr . .,On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 
1961-1969: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics., China Quarterly 
50 (1972): 220-221. 
21 . . ( A.T. Steele The American People and China New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 266. 
22 . d . . . ( John Lewis Ga dis, Strategies of Containment New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 230. 
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fided to close friends that any real changes in policy might 
23 have to wait until the second term. Publicly, Kennedy said 
the same thing. In a March, 1961 news conference he insisted, 
"I would like to see a lessening of tensions with the Chinese 
. 24 Communists." 
Despite these statements, on the eve of his administration, 
and for most of his tenure in office, Kennedy · accepted and 
maintair.ed the inherited policy. Basically, this included the 
non-recognition of the People's Republic, a firm opposition 
to the admission of Peking to the united Nations, the mainte-
nance of defending Taiwan in the case of attack by the Chinese 
Communists, and any and all assistance to nations near or 
bordering the China mainland. 25 
The only significant area in which Kennedy differed from 
the Eisenhower administration was on the issue of the offshore 
islands, Quemoy and Matsu. During the 1960 campaign, Kennedy 
and opponent Richard Nixon generally agreed on the China issue, 
but differed on this specific topic. In the first presiden-
tial debate, Nixon stated that the two islands, both situated 
approximately five miles off the coast of mainland China, were 
symbolic in that the United States would defend them as a means 
23 Thomson,"On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-1969: 
A Study in Bureaucratic Politics" p. 222. 
24 · · . 273 Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. . 
25
china and the U.S., 1955-1963. ed.Kwan Ha Yim (New 
York: Facts on Fil ·e, Inc., 1973), p. 137. 
( 
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of showing the Chinese Communists that the U.S. would not 
give up an inch of land witqout a fight. Kennedy rebutted 
the Vice-President, stating, "I think it's unwise to take a 
chance of being dragged into a war whict may lead to world war 
over two islands which are not strategica l ly defensible ••• 1126 
For Kennedy, this rebuttal was a dramatic move and he refused 
to take another on the China issue. 
John F. Kennedy took office in 1961 with a group of men 
ful 1 of confidence, advocating action and a new .. theme. Yet 
for most of these men this meant an adherance to the ideals 
of the Cold War. The New Frontier was nothing more than a 
change in tactics on dealing with communism. By maintaining 
the ideals of the Cold War, the administration hindered it-
self when it talked of a new China policy. 
26 · . · ' 1 t b Democratic National Committee News etter, 0c o er, 
1960. Box 1030, Pre-Presidential Papers of John F. Kennedy. 
CHAPTER II 
THE UNITED NATIONS QUESTION 
Historical Basis 
The first major issue facing the administration, in 
terms of its China policy, was the status of the Chinese 
representation in the united Nations. In addition to being 
the first issue on the China question, it was also the most 
feared by Kennedy. Political consequences, according to Ken-
nedy, would be catastrophic if the U.S. changed its polic y on 
this specific issue. Prior to 1961, the policy had been . to 
actively oppose the admission of the Chinese Communists. This 
included lobbying for an American resolution that opposed any 
change in the status of Chinese representation. The U.S. had 
backed the Nationalists as the rightful government for all 
Chinese since 1951, refusing to recognize the legitimacy of 
the Peking government. The American resolution was actually 
a proposal for a moratorium on any discussion o-f the Chinese 
representation issue, which the U.S., of course, feared. By 
1961, this moratorium was beginning to lose its effective-
ness and Kennedy realized that a new strategy, not a new 
policy, was needed to preserve the Nationalists• ·seat in the 
Security Council and the General Assembly. 
-16-
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Initial Steps 
The State Department was ordered by Kennedy to study 
this issue and then present an estimation of the number of 
votes the U.S. could rely on to side with its objective. In 
May, 1961, the estimate was sent to McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's 
National Security Assistant. The report agreed with the Presi-
dent's thinking; the moratorium was indeed losing its effective-
ness. A growing number of nations were beginning to come to 
the conclusion that keeping Peking out was unrealistic. The 
report cited the need for new tactics, something that pro-
tected the image of the U.S. Most of the nations, according 
to the report, believed in the "two-Chinas" idea which would 
allow both Chinese governments to be seated. 1 This was simi-
lar to the proposal put forth by Chester Bowles, but Kennedy 
was apprehensive about the idea. 
The President must have blanched when he read how the 
other nations were thinking, but he may have also realized 
that the U.S. was indeed hurting itself by constantly appearing 
as the leader of the opposition on the China question. This 
stance would not be conducive to the administration's efforts 
to influence third world nations. In effect, this meant Ken-
.nedy now needed 'to propose a new strategy, one that protected 
U.S. interests while also protecting its image. 
1Department of State Memorandum, May 24, 1961. De-
classified February 5, 1975, (Washington, D.C.: Carrollton 
Press, Inc., 1976), Abstract 767-D. 
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Kennedy believed that any international gains from 
actively supporting the admission of the Chinese Communists 
would be severely outweighed by the political uproar in the 
U.S. Arthur M. Schlesinger, a White House Assistant, quoted 
Kennedy from this period as concluding "But if we lost the 
fight, if Red China comes into the U,N, during our first year 
in town ... they'll run us out. So as far as this year is con-
cerned, you (Stevenson) must do everything you can to keep 
2 them out." Another historian, Donald Lord, reinforced 
Schlesinger, maintaining that Kennedy acted in a manner that 
would stop the Communists from taking a seat in the U.N., 
fearing the pol~tical repercussions. 3 Other scholars, inclu-
ding Kenneth Young, believe Kennedy did indeed look for a 
major change in policy in relation to the U.N. question, but 
balked on the issue due to the political climate in the u.s. 4 
All three scholars believe Kennedy was looking to change 
policy, not just tactics. However, Kennedy never illustrated 
this. He may have spoke in private of this, but he never put 
his thoughts into action. 
Kennedy remained worried about public opinion in rela-
tion to the U.N. question. Most of the population was opposed 
2 . ( Arthur M, Schlesinger Jr. A Thousand Days New York: 
Fawcett Premier, 1965), pp. 446-447. 
3 Donald Lord John F. Kennedy: The Politics of Confron-
tation and Conciliation (Woodbury, New York: Barron's, 1977), 
p. 226. 
4Kenneth T. Youn~, Negotiating With the Chinese Com-
munists (New York: Mc<;;raw-Hill, 1968), p. 240. 
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to the idea of allowing the Chinese Communists into the U.N. 
However, most of these · same people agreed that the U.S. should 
go along with the U.N. if the Peking government was granted 
.d . . s 
a mission. 
alternatives. 
This mixed opinion presented Kennedy with several 
The administration's alternatives included the 
options: 1. to continue the existing policy of lobbying against 
the People's Republic; 2. to advocate the "two-chinas" propo-
sal; 3. to let the General Assembly decide t.he arrangement 
as long as the Nationalists remained a separate entity. 6 The 
President eventually remained tied to the first alternative, 
refusing to change neither tactics nor policy. 
On the same day the State Department delivered its report 
on the voting estimates in the U.N., Kennedy met with Rusk 
and Stevenson. This meeting was a discussion of the policy 
the administration should adopt on the China issue in the U.N. 
What Kennedy wanted was a strategy that would protect the 
status quo, keeping the Nationalists in and the Communists 
out. At one point, Kennedy confronted Stevenson and asked 
him if he, Stevenson, wanted the Peking delegation to be seated 
in the General Assembly. Although Stevenson had previously 
called for the admission he refused to battle the President at 
5 Gerry Ruth Sack Tyler, "A Contextual Analysis of Public 
Opinion Polls: The Question of Admission of Communist China 
to the United Nations" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 
1972), p. 114. 
6 . . . William Bayer and Neyland Akra, "The United States and 
the Admission of Communist China" Political Science Quarterly 
76 (September, 1961): 342. 
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this time and meekly answered no to the question. This gave 
Kennedy the assurance that all present supported his policy 
and he to-ld the two men that, above all, the integrity of the 
7 Nationalists had to be protected, and their U.N. seat preserved. 
In concluding the meeting, Kennedy reiterated his anxiety over 
this issue and the potential trouble it could cause the ad-
ministration in 1964. 
The relationship between the United States and Taiwan 
reflected Kennedy's policy of caution. The President was un-
sure of himself in his relationship with Chiang Kai-shek. 
There was always subtle antagonism in their letters, a mutual 
feeling of uneasiness. However, Kennedy, due to political 
problems, could not turn his back on the Generalissimo. Still, 
even though Kennedy looked to maintain the status quo on this 
issue, he had his hands full with Chiang. On April 1, 1961, 
Chiang wrote 
"two-Chinas" 
Kennedy, expressing his personal distaste for the 
8 proposal. Kennedy, in replying to the General-
issimo, maintained that "one of our major objectives in the 
United Nations is the maintenance of the status of the Repub-
lic of China as a member of the organization", but warned 
Chiang that Peking was gaining allies around the world who 
could potentially vote Peking in and Taiwan out. 9 In essence, 
7Meeting Minutes, May 24, 1961. Box 22, National Security 
Files, John F. Kennedy Libra -ry Archives, Dorchester, Massachusetts. 
8 h' . 1 . C iang to Kennedy, April , 1961. Box 113A, President's 
Office Files, · John F. Kennedy Library Archives, Dorchester, · 
Massachusetts. 
9 Kennedy to Chiang, April 17, 1961, Box 113A, 
Office Files. 
' President's 
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Kennedy was telling Chiang that the U.S. was not changing 
policy, rather strategy. 
Chiang had been perceptive when he told Kennedy that he 
was aware that the new administration was looking at the "two-
Chinas" proposal, but he was wrong to think Kennedy would 
allow it to . be accepted. Kennedy looked at this proposal 
not as a change in policy, but as a means of maintaining the 
status quo. 
The reason Kennedy looked at this proposal was due to an 
article that had appeared in Look magazine in January, 1961. 
Although it might seem unorthodox for Kennedy to be influenced 
in policy by a magazine article, this particular article was 
exceptional. Look had obtained a special visa from the State 
Department that allowed Edgar Snow to travel to the Chinese 
mainland. Snow had Known Mao and Chou prior to the 1949 re-
volution and he wished to go back ·to China to see how much it 
had changed under the communist government. While in China, 
Snow interviewed both leaders, accepting their rule of no 
quotes. Chou did make an exception to the rule in order to 
clarify one point. He told Snow that the American policy-
makers should forget the idea of two separate Chinas since 
Taiwan was an internal issue, one that would be solved by the 
. 10 . . Chinese. In general, the Snow article presented the Chinese 
leadership as very anti-American. Both men lambasted the U.S. 
10 Edgar Snow, "A Report From Red China" Look 25 (January 
31, 196 l) : 91 . 
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for trying to meddle in Chinese affairs. 
After reading this article, Kennedy realized that Peking 
would never accept the "two-Chinas" proposal. This meant he 
could allow it to be accepted by the General Assembly and not 
have to worry since Peking would refuse the seat. In turn, 
this would improve the image of the U.S. 
It is important to remember that Kennedy liked to tell 
administration officials that he found the existing U.N. policy 
silly, claiming that he was "looking toward some change _ in our 
policy of regarding the government in Taiwan as the true 
government of all China." 11 -However, Kennedy also maintained 
that he could not turn from the exis .ting policy due to poli-
tical consequences. He had to preserve the Nationalists' seat 
in the U.N. or face the wrath of Congress and the China Lobby. 
In the end, he moved away from his "smoke-screen" strategy 
and maintained the policy of postponing the U.N. issue. 
By the summer of 1961, Kennedy began to lose his nerve on 
this strategy. The nagging question remained: What if the 
Chinese Communists accepted the idea of two separate Chinas 
and took a seat in the U.N.? To Kennedy, this was an un-
acceptable risk. By September, the proposal calling for the 
acceptance of the "two-Chinas" resolution was now discar ded. 
Kennedy was now looking to turn from this policy, hoping 
to go to a safer plateau on the U.N. issue. The proposal 
11 - . - . Roger H1.1sman, To Move a Nation ( Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967), p. 303. 
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he finally accepted called for creating a resolution in the 
U.N. that would make the China issue an "important question." 
The "important question" resolution "expressed the readiness 
of the assembly to consider the credentials of the People's 
. . . . 12 Republic of China, as a member of the United Nations." By 
adopting this resolution as his strategy, Kennedy once again 
allowed the China issue to be postponed. This resolution 
did nothing more than call for a five-nation group to study 
the question of Chinese representation; there would be no vote 
on their findings until 1962 at the earliest. 13 The President 
was now backing away from any proposals that were politically 
dangerous and moving back to the Eisenhower policy, albeit 
under a different name. Despite his private statements that 
talked of the contrary, Kennedy remained with the policy he 
inherited. 
Bracing For a Storm 
Although it is clear that Kennedy was never serious 
about altering U.S. policy over the China question, there were 
individuals who feared that the new President might. In May 
of 1962, Kennedy met with Henry Luce, one such individual. 
Owner of Time-Life Corporation and long-time proponent of 
Chiang's government, Luce was anxious to hear of Kennedy's 
12P d . . . ropose United Nations Resolution, July, 1961. Box 
113A, President's Office Files. 
13 Rusk to Kennedy, July 31, 1961. Declassified February 
5, 1975, (Washington, D.C.: Carrollton Press, Inc., 1976), 
Abstract 767-E. 
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plans for the U.N. question. Kennedy, hoping to express to 
Luce that his goal was identical to Eisenhower's, told Luce 
the same thing he told Chiang in April. This included the 
basis of his policy - retaining thE Nationalists• seat. The 
only difference was the means of attaining the goal. During 
their conversation, the President explained to Luce that the 
U.S. was hurting itself by actively opposing Peking's admission. 
Luce was assured by Kennedy that the Nationalists' seat would 
be preserved. 14 
According to an oral history interview at the John F, 
Kennedy Library, Luce agreed with the administration's min-
utes of this meeting. He stated that Kennedy pointed out to 
him that the U.S. could be beaten using the old strategy. All 
Luce could offer as a way of suggestion was continued support 
for Chiang and the maintenance of the hard line against Pe-
. 15 king. 
In the fall of 1961 Kennedy moved further away from any 
new proposals on the U.N. question. He did not want to lose 
on this issue nor did he want to antagonize his political en-
emies. This led him to reconsider his options and to all out 
support for Chiang. On two occasions, Kennedy and his assistant 
' Bundy, spoke of the need ·to maint.ain Chiang's government. On 
October 11, Bundy sent a memorandum to a fellow staff member 
14 conversation With Luce, May 24, 1961, Box 113A, Presi~ 
dent's Office Files. 
15 . . . . Oral History Interview of Henry R. Luce. Oral History 
Collection, John F. Kennedy Library Archives, Dorchester, Massa-
chusetts. 
• 
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citing the President's willingness to "give private reassur-
ances to the Generalissimo that if any time a U.S. veto is 
what will be effective in preventing Chinese Communist entry 
into the U.N. the U.S. will use the veto." 16 On October 16, 
Kennedy himself reiterated this policy to - Bundy, assuring his 
assistant that the administration could ill-afford to lose on 
the representation question. 17 As time progressed, Kennedy 
became less willing to take chances, refusing to open him-
self up for any political attacks. 
The Kennedy Legacy 
In retrospect, the Kennedy policy on this issue was one 
of caution and near paranoia. Although he privately spoke 
of creating a new policy on this issue, realizing that the 
existing policy was unrealistic, Kennedy failed to take the 
first step. He did not change policy, but he did change the 
means of attaining the existing goal. 
The administration saw the U.N. issue as the first test 
of its ability to act against Peking. By setting a precedent 
on this issue, Kennedy was able to avoid any political criti-
cism from the like of the China Lobby and Congress. But Ken-
nedy was over-reacting in his fear. True, his political foes 
were formidable, but it is questionable if they could have 
done as much as Kennedy feared. In addition to this, the 
16Bundy to Cline, October 11, 1961. Box 22, National 
Security Files. 
17Kennedy to Bundy, October 16, 1961. Box 22, National 
Security Files. 
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public was willing to accept the Chinese Communists in the 
U.N., if Peking had the support of other nations. 
The Kennedy administration was correct in seeing this as 
its first test on its C~ina policy. This issue did set the 
tone for the administration's policy tdwards the People's Re-
public, · but the tone created was highly negative. This tone 
relected an- administration led by a President who was short-
sighted and unwilling to take the initiative in rationalizing 
the American attitude towards the government of Peking. 
Problems arose from this policy and hu~t the remainder 
of the administration's Asian plans. While Kennedy spoke 
publicly of keeping the door open to the Chinese, and pri-
vately of his dislike for the existing policy, he was, in 
reality, acting in a manner contrary to each stance. 
It would be foolish to criticize Kennedy for not actively 
supporting the admission of Peking in 1961. The point is that 
Kennedy, instead of pursuing a policy that once again blocked 
the Chinese entry into the U.N., should have let the issue 
evolve by itself. If the Chinese had been admitted, so be it; 
the administration should .have been wise enough to accept the 
reality of the situation. 
• CI{API'ER III 
THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT 
The Administration and Communism 
John Kennedy matured politically as a member of both 
houses of Congress in the l940' s and l950's. The President 
and his .advisors, most of whom had also matured in the same 
era, drew upon their past experiences as a source for creating 
foreign policy for the l960's. In effect, the New Frontier 
reflected this as the Kennedy administration sought to actively 
combat communism. Specifically, Kennedy, Rµsk, Robert McNa-
mara, as well as McGeorge Bundy, all saw the threat of com-
munism in the true ideals of the Cold War. Included in · this 
perception was seeing all communist nations as monolithic in 
nature. This type of thinking had been part of American diplo-
macy since 1945 when the Chinese Communist Party was seen by 
the Truman administration as a mere extension of the Soviet 
.. 
Union. Despite Stalin's explanation regarding the national-
istic tendencies of the Peking regime, American policymakers 
in the l940's, l950's, and into the l960's saw the two com-
munist nations _as monolithic in ideology and in policy. 
Only after seve!al years in office did the Kennedy admini-
stration realize that this perception was incorrect. Even 
though American ).eaders ;Eirially came to grips with the dif-
-27-
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ferences evident among communist nations, the administration 
failed to see this as a means of creating a new China policy, 
choosing instead to hold onto the old policy to a greater ex-
tent. 
Initial Reactions 
Disagreements between the Soviet union and the People's 
Republic began to occur on a regular basis in the latter 1950's. 
These disagreements generally revcived around foreign policy. 
Each side reflected a different understanding of Lenin's 
philosophy on communist revolution. Following the death of 
Stalin in 1957, specific issues revealed these differences. 
When Nikita Khrushchev emerged as the new Soviet leader, the 
new Premier advocated a less militant foreign policy towards 
the West. The Chinese Communists, under the leadership of 
Mao and Chou En-lai, opposed Khrushchev on this policy, main-
taining that the West could not be defeated through relaxation 
of hostilities. Within this general argument emerged several 
subtopics where ideological differences grew more apparent. 
The significance of the dispute between the Soviets and 
the Chinese proved that the communist bloc was not as united 
as America thought. As the l950•s ended, the Chinese were 
beginning to break away from the uniform policy put forth by 
the Russians, but this was not always the case. Immediately 
following the Chinese revolution in 1949, the Peking · govern-
ment was willing to follow the Soviet lead, allowing Stalin to 
dictate policy for both nations. In short, the Soviets acted 
very much like the big brother to the new Chinese government. 
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The strongest element of the relationship was the policy of 
v~ewing the U.S. as the enemy of world-wide communism. 1 
Stalin's policy advocated hostility towards the U.S. and the 
Chinese were willing to accept this policy due to their bitter 
feelings towards the Americans after 1949. 
When Khrushchev denounced Stalin and his policy of hos-
tility, the Chinese were not willing to follow suit. The 
new Soviet leader wanted a relaxed relationship with the U.S., 
hoping to create detente · or "peaceful co-existence." In turn, 
Khrushchev feared Chinese hostility towards the West would 
disrupt the _se hopes. 
Included in this disagreement, on the Chinese side, was 
the issue of nuclear weapons. The Chinese were actively pur-
suing a program that would have allowed them to join the "nu-
clear club". They were wary of Khrushchev's policy of detente 
because they feared that the Soviets would be more willing to 
negotiate an arms control agreement with the U.S. rather than 
to assist them on developing nuclear capability. 
As mentioned above, this dispute went virtually un-
noticed in the U.S. throughout the l950•s. The first report 
on the dispute appeared in January, 1961. The Central Intell-
igence Agency had obtained information in October of 1960, 
but it was rarer presented until two days prior to the Kennedy 
inauguration. Most of the report's analysis came from the re-
1
cIA Report, April 1, 1961. Box 21, National SeGurity 
Files, John F. Kennedy Library Archives, Dorchester, Massa-
chusetts. 
-30-
sults of the Conference of Communist Nations that w-~ held 
in June, 1960. The report concluded that the Chinese Com-
munists denounced the "formation of the peaceful road to com-
munism" which Khrushchev had advocated. 2 In addition to this, 
the Chinese also denounced the Soviets for threatening the Po-
lish government with military force in the 1950 1 s. In 1956, 
the Soviets had moved to censure the Poles, something with 
which the Chinese did not agree. This was an illustration of 
how sympathetic the Chinese were towards independent action · 
within the communist bloc. The CIA also cited Khrushchev as 
willing to strike back at the Chinese, criticizing Chinese 
aggression towards India in 1959. 3 This was an illustration 
of the Soviet fear of Chinese adventurism and an example of 
Soviet dislike for an attack on a Russian ally. The report 
concluded that Khrushchev was willing to negotiate with the 
U.S., citing the Soviet Premier's statement that 1960 was "the 
year in which the aspirations of humanity for a world without 
armed forces and without war" was possible. 4 The Chinese, 
desperately striving to create a nuclear arsenal, were not 
over-joyed with this statement. 
A second study conducted by the CIA was presented on the 
first of April, 1961. This report was more analytical, em-
2
cIA Report, January 19, 1961. Declassified September 
14, 1979, (Washington, D.C.1 Carrollton Press, Inc., 1980), 
Abstract 339-A. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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phasizing the effect of the dispute on the United States. 
It concluded that the split between the Soviets and the Chi-
nese was growing, the main reason for the growth being Khrush-
chev's willingness to negotiate with the U.S. The core of 
this dispute was the nuclear issue. The CIA declared, "They 
(the Chinese) are not worried about the Nth countries; they 
. 5 . intend to be one." The report estimated that . Mao would not 
be willing to enter into any arms talks without the capability 
to _produce weapons. Mao, insisted the CIA, "intends to use 
the resulting leverage to demand the return of Taiwan, dip-
lomatic recognition, and perhaps admission to the U.N. 116 
What worried Mao was the speed of the Chinese developmental 
program; without Soviet assistance the program would falter. 
All of the above conclusions must have had a sobering 
effect on Kennedy and it justifies his anxieties over Peking. 
Yet despite the realization of the Chinese threat, Kennedy did 
nothing to -better relations with Peking. Instead, he chose 
to increase his policy of containing the Chinese. This was 
reflected in his willingness to increase American involvement 
in Vietnam. 
Publicly, Kennedy refused to make any significant state-
ments ori the Sino-Soviet split in the early months of his 
tenure. In March, 1961, when asked about his thoughts on the 
dispute, he replied that he was not very enthusiastic about 
5 CIA Report, April 1, 1961. Box 22, National Security Files. 
6 Ibid. 
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the situation. Later, in the Fall of 1961, he was again 
asked for his feelings on the split and he stated that there 
was not enough concrete data to truly assess the conflict. 7 
The question is how much data did he need to consider it 
concrete? The April CIA report alone was over sixty pages, 
complete with a history of the dispute and its significance 
for the U.S. There was enough data; what was lacking was a 
positive response from the administration, something besides 
a policy of continued containment. 
American Response . 
Kennedy and his administration began to closely watch 
the progression of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the latter part 
of 1961. In addition to the two CIA reports, the admini-
stration prepared its own analysis of the split, trying to 
come to some conclusions. In general, the administration's 
analysis went beyond the CIA's perception and indicated that 
the Chinese were now the long-term threat to the United States, 
surpassing the Soviets in hostility and militancy. 8 Secre-
tary of State Rusk, for whatever reason, failed to articulate 
this analysis, stating only that there was "solid evidence of 
some tensions" between the Chinese and Soviets, and that the 
United States could do nothing in response to the existing 
7 . . . Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. 
(Washington, D.C.: United StatesGovernment Printing Office, 
1962), John F~ Kennedy, 1961. 
8Richard Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 
1961 (New York: Harper and Brother, 1962), p. 219. 
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. . 9 . 
situation. This type of statement, from the State Depart-
ment leader, indicated a lack of foresight on the part of 
many within the administration. Rusk saw evidence of the dis-
pute, but failed to formulate a new . policy to reflect the split ·. 
It must be concluded that Rusk and the administration did not . 
see the dangers the split presented nor did it see the possibi-
lities that could emerge. Here was a chance for the Kennedy 
administration to open the door to the Chinese, but Kennedy 
refused to take the initiative • . In turn, the door remained 
closed and tightly secured. 
In 1962 the Kennedy administration stepped up its interest 
in the Sino-Soviet tensions. In early January, a State De-
partment Policy Planning meeting was the scene for a presenta-
tion by the Far East bureau which concluded that the split 
was not only real, but that permanent obstacles had now emerged 
between Peking and Moscow. 10 In May, Roger Hilsman sent a 
memorandum to Rusk, indicating a need to come to terms with 
the issue. Although Hilsman presented a realistic assessment 
of the dispute, he failed to offer any recommendations for a 
positive American response. Drawing from intelligence reports, 
Hilsman maintained that while the two communist nations were 
deeply divided, both feared a complete break in relations. 
9 Ibid., p. 225. 
10 h . h. . James C,. Thomson Jr., "Ont e Making of U.S. C ina Policy, 
1961-1969: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics" _C_h_i_n_a_Q;::_.u_a..;;r_t_e_r_l.,_y 
50 (Fall, 1972): 226. 
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~ 
On this aspect, Hilsman believed that American-Soviet detente 
would encourage a complete split. 11 Hilsman•s conclusion was 
an accurate one. If Kennedy was going to act in a manner that 
inYited detente, he had to take into consideration the Chinese 
response. This included any plans for negotiating with the 
Soviets on nuclear weapons since • the Chinese would have to be 
considered as a potential threat. 
A related second point that Hilsman brought up, was the 
position taken by the two communist governments on future re-
lations with the United Stat~s. While Khrushchev was apparently 
moving towards detente, the Chinese continued to assail the 
Kennedy administration as imperialists. 12 The Chinese re-
fused to back away from the Stalinist policy of hostility. To 
them, the Kennedy administration was an unknown quantity. The 
Chinese perception was based on general statements by Kennedy 
and members of his administration. The Chinese believed the 
U.S. was not out to better relations, but rather . to contain 
the mainland. 
A closer look at the dispute is necessary in order to 
understand the issues within the split at this sta~e and their 
relation to the United States. By 1962, the dispute was be-
coming a three-sided situation. The Soviets, Chinese, and the 
Americans were all involved, creating a vicious cycle in which 
11 . . 1 2 Hilsman to Rusk, May 14, 96 • Box 1, Personal Papers 
of Roger Hilsman, John F. Kennedy Library Archives, Dorchester, 
Massachusetts. 
12 Ibid. 
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the Soviets and Americans spun closer together while the 
Chinese spun away from them. When the Soviets demonstrated 
a willingness to move closer to the U.S., the Sino-Soviet 
dispute grew and the Chinese began to appear as the "bad 
guys" in the relationship. The cycle would continue when 
China would denounce the Kennedy administration and Khrush-
chev. An example of this was in August, 1962, when the So-
viets refused to give the Chinese any new nuclear assistance 
or technology, agreeing with the Kennedy administration that 
both nations should try to prevent further proliferation of 
13 
nuclear weapons. This infuriated the Chinese who quickly 
denounced Khrushchev. In October, after the Cuban missile 
crisis, Peking increased criticism of the Soviet leadership, 
insisting that Khrushchev had fallen to a "paper tiger." 
The Soviet Premier was livid over this statement and declared 
the Chinese were acting like "Troskyites" who failed to see 
the tiger's "nuclear teeth. 1114 This vicious cycle continued 
throughout 1962. 
-
In relation to this, Hilsman openly commented to Rusk 
about problems associated with the dispute. Hilsman realized 
that the U.S. could push for detente with the Soviets only at 
the expense of further isolating the Chinese. 15 In essence, 
13P . . eter H. Juviler and Henry w. Morton, gen. eds., Soviet 
Policy Making (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967), "America, 
China, and the Hydra-Headed Opposition", by Robert M. Slusser, 
. p. 220. 
14 Ibid., p. 228. 
15 Hilsrnan to Rusk, May 14, 1962, Hilsman Papers 
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the Chinese woul~ become an isolated state with a nuclear 
arsenal. This worried Hilsman and while he called for ac-
tion, he could not recommend any to Rusk. This was the di-
lemma for the administration - it believed it had to act, but 
it was not quite sure · how. 
Walter Rostow, Chairman of the Policy Planning Cancil 
at the State Department, exemplified this dilemma . . In the 
January meeting of the Council, Rostow, along with Rusk, ex-
pressed an inability to come to terms with the Sino-Soviet 
dispute. According to Rostow, "No one knows what to do about 
it. Is it good or -bad for us? 1116 He finally deduced that 
the split was "essentially a favorable event for us," but 
could not assess whether the U.S. wanted a clean break be~ 
. 17 . . tween Moscow and Peking. At the same meeting, Rusk again 
offered no analysis and called for further study by the State 
Department. One year after the first full report on the dis-
pute, the Kennedy braintrust at the State Department, still 
could not formulate a policy in response to the situation. 
While Rostow can be commended for being one of the first 
members of the administration to admit that monolithic com-
munism was a fallacy, he was also unwilling to see the impli-
cations of this discovery, choosing instead to maintain a 
rigid stance against both sides of the dispute. Rostow be-
16 Policy Pianning Council, January 2, 1962. Personal 
Papers of James C. Thomson Jr., Box 15, John F. Kennedy 
Library Archives, Dorchester, Massachusetts. 
17 Ibid. 
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lieyed, in conjunction with the two CIA reports, that the 
Soviets and Chinese mlght be in the midst of a quarrel with 
each other, but, in the end, the "Reds were still fundamen-
tally hostile to the West. 1118 Rather than seeing the split . 
as something positive, as he had declared in January, Rostow 
now backtracked into seeing the dispute as insignificant. Ro-
stow•s thinking illustrated the lack of willingness to move 
ahead within the Kennedy administration. Here was a chance 
for the U.S. to create better relations with China, but the 
administration chose instead to maintain the hard line of 
containment. 
The initiatives that did emerge from the administration 
proved to be even more rigid than the existing policy. The 
President now saw the Chinese as the real threat to world 
peace, stating, "we could be worse off ... if the Chinese dom-
inated the communist movement, because they believe in war as 
h b . . b . d 19 P bl. 1 t e means of ringing a out the communist worl ." u 1.c y, 
Kennedy maintained that there was little the U.S. could do 
over the dispute, but in actuality, the administration was 
acting by moving closer to the Soviets. While accommodating 
himself with the Russians, Ke~nedy was also increasing his 
policy of containment against the Chinese. By doing this, the 
lS . dd. . . t ( Y k John Lewis Ga is, Strategies of Containmen New or: 
Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 209. 
19 Public Papers of the Presidents of the united States 
(Washington, · D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1963), John F. Kennedy, 1962, p. 900. 
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President was going against the private remarks he had made 
concerning the new direction he hoped to take in relation to 
the China policy. 
While Kennedy called the Chinese the greatest threat to 
world peace, he was actually misleading the American public. 
·rn reality, the Chinese posed a potential threat, not a pre~ 
sent one. In 1962, the Chinese were still two years away from 
detonating their first nuclear device. One observer saw China 
as containing both a billion "human bees" and the potential 
t t b h . 20 o crea ea "nuclear ee ive". But this was China's po-
tential, not its present situation. The Chinese, in 1962, 
were a "have-not" nation in terms of industrial capability, 
bl . . . . 21 una e to sustain an expanded military operation. 
Kennedy should have emphasized the word potential and 
he should have taken steps to alleviate that potential threat. 
However, he chose to maintain the policy of containment rather 
than create a policy of negoti~tion. The administration was 
was consistent on this issue in relation to its overall China 
policy. Kennedy refused to see the implications of not de-
veloping a long~range strategy in response to the Sino-Soviet 
dispute. 
2
°Kenneth Young Memorandum, November, 1960. Box 121, 
President's Office Files, John F. Kennedy Library Archives, 
Dorchester, Massachusetts. 
21 · · · 19 Bowles Confirmation Hearing, January , 1961. Box 
7, Personal Papers of James c. Thomson Jr. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT 
Willing To Act 
The first three chapters of this study have illustrated 
what John Kennedy was not willing to do in terms of his China 
policy. He refused to re-evaluate the policy as a whole, he 
backed away from allowing the United Nations to accept the 
"two-Chinas" resolution, and he refused to .see the Sino-Soviet 
split as a means of creating better relations between the U .S. 
and Red China. This chapter will demonstrate what Kennedy was 
willing to do in order to implement a polic y . One cannot 
conclude that Kennedy did nothing to alter relations between 
Washington and Peking, but it should be stressed that what he . 
did do in this area act~ally pushed the two apart, relations 
growing colder. When it came to confronting and containing Red 
china, John Kennedy was an eager participant. 
The policy of containing the Chinese centered around 
two issues: the Laos crisis in 1961 and 1962, and the status 
and protection of India. Both issues were focal points for 
Kennedy's policy. In 1963, Vietnam would join this list. 
Kennedy was out to show the Chinese that he would not be 
bullied and that American policy was stronger than before. In 
essence, Kennedy reinforced the Eisenhower policy. 
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Laos 
Kennedy inherited a delicate situation with the Laos 
crisis. The circumstances in Laos could not be described as 
anything other than a prime example of Cold War dogma and ac-
tion. It was a situation that neither the U.S. nor the com-
munists could hope to win without a major military escalation. 
In 1960, Eisenhower warned Kennedy of the seriousness of 
the situation, cautioning the new President that there was a 
distinct possibility that American troops would be needed in 
Laos to avert the fall of the pro-American government to com-
munist backed forces. 1 Kennedy welcomed this challenge, hoping 
to draw upon his Cold War experience and confront the communist 
threat. Outside of the Bay of Pigs, Laos became the admini-
stration's first "hot spot." The administration dove into the 
fray, seeking quick and favorable results for the U.S. Ken-
nedy saw Laos as the chance to implement the policy of con-
tainment. And this policy would be directed at the Chinese 
Communists. · 
Eisenhower, when he advised Kennedy of the severity of 
the crisis, may have been informing his successor that the 
American effort in Laos was not going very well. The Repub-
lican administration had been giving strong support to the 
pro-American government, the Royal Lao, headed by Prince Boun 
Oum and General Nosavan Phoumi, since 1954. However, in his 
1Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 
1965), p. 640. ' 
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desire to support the Royal Lao, Eisenhower had caJ.sed the 
neutral faction, headed by Souvanna Phouma, to look to the 
Pathet-Lao, the communist force, for assistance. 2 Kennedy, 
after entering office, soon realized that the situation in 
Laos was not going in the right direction for the U.S. · The 
Royal Lao was deteriorating in strength and in: influence. The 
Soviet Union was sending aid to the Pathet Lao which was be-
ginning to- win battles on a regular basis over the Royal 
Lao Army. Members of the Royal La9 forces demonstrated to 
the U.S. that they lacked the determination to win the civil 
war. The Pathet Lao was quickly becoming the dominant force 
in Laos, and Kennedy had to act in order to counter this. 
All of this left Kennedy in a position where he had to 
re-evaluate his policy. Either he could continue to support 
the Royal Lao, increasing American aid or possibly sending 
troops to Laos, or he could begin preparations to initiate 
the process of creating a new nation, a neutral Laos. If 
Kennedy wanted an independent Laos, one under the leadership 
of a coalition government, he had to be willin~{ to negotiate. 
The President was correct when he acknowledged the strength 
of the Pathet Lao who had the power to eventually overrun the 
Royal Lao, something that Kennedy did not want to happen. If 
this did occur, Kennedy realized that U.S. commitments to south-
East Asia could be severely jepordized. Specifically, if 
2 The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume II (Boston: 
Beacon Press), p. 22. 
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Kennedy allowed the Royal Lao to fall, then, in his mind, 
China might see the U.S. as unwilling to live up to its com-
mitments in the region. Kennedy believed he had to remain 
firm in Laos, even though he was considering negotiations. 
He emphasized that ".we cannot accept a Communist military ex-
pansion backed by China into this critical area. ;,3 The policy 
of containing China and protecting American interests in South-
east Asia remained the Kennedy doctrine. 
In Laos, the Soviets were the primary supplier to the 
Pathe :t Lao, with Peking and Hanoi offering various forms of 
aid. Although China was not acting in as great a capacity as 
_the Soviets, Kennedy still feared Peking more than Moscow in 
Laos. He maintained that China was the great threat in Asia, 
stating in his first State of the Union Adress, "In Asia, the 
relentless pressures of the Chinese Communists menace the 
security of the entire region ..• " 4 · Kennedy was also an ad-
vocate of the then popular "domino theory", keeping consistent 
with the Eisenhower policy. Both Eisenhower and Kennedy be-
lieved a communist victory in Laos_ would be the first step 
towards an eventual communist Southeast Asia. Short of war, 
Kennedy felt he had to act to ensure against this. 
3Kennedy to Prime Minister Nehru, April 16, 1961. Box 
111, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library Ar-
chives, Dorchester, Massachusetts. 
4 b . . . d . Pu lie Papers of the Presidents of the Unite States. 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1962), John . F. Kennedy, 1961. p. 23. 
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Historian Hugh Toye is quite supportive of Kennedy's 
actions to try and reach a ·peaceful and negotiated settle-
ment in Laos. Toye saw Kennedy, by March 1961, as moving 
further away from the Eisenhower policy of military assistance 
to the Royal Lao, and towards the policy of negotiations to 
mitigate the crisis. 5 William Leuchtenberg, a fellow his-
torian, agreed with Toye, noting Kennedy was "more willing than 
Eisenhower to countenance a solution in Southeast Asia which 
would neutralize the region and less insistent on outright 
triumph for the West." 6 A third scholar, Frances Fitzsimons, 
interpreted the Laos policy a bit differently. She agreed 
with Toye and Leuchtenberg on the point that Kennedy was in-
deed disappointed with the military status in Laos, but she 
contended that Kennedy was calling for negotiations without 
reneging on a policy of containment, something Toye and Leuch-
tenberg failed to deal with. 7 According to •Fitzsimons, Ken-
nedy was not willing to back away from U.S. commitments in 
Laos and let the Pathet Lao take the nation over. Thus, she 
contended, he chose negotiations as an alternative still with-
in his policy of containing the Chinese. 
The three scholars agreed on Kennedy's means, but only 
5 Hugh Toye, Laos: Buffer State or Battleground (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 165-166. 
6John F. Kennedy and the New Frontier. Aida Donald, gen. 
ed., (New York: Hill and Wang, 1966), "Kennedy and the End of 
the Post-War World" by William Leuchtenberg, p. 127. 
7 Frances Fitzsimons, The Kennedy Doctrine (New York: 
Random House, 1972), pp. 83, 92. 
F. 
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Fitzsimons perceived his goal - a policy of continued con-
tainment - correctly, While Toye and Leuchtenberg seemed to 
see Kennedy as willing to "back off" in Laos, in reality he 
was doing what he thought was right in order to protect Ameri-
can interests. 
This is not to conclude that Kennedy was not interested 
in a neutral Laos. The President believed in this g oal, but 
supported measures that would protect his policy of contain-
ment. To illustrate Kennedy's beliefs, a series of docu-
ments from the time period can be analyzed. In March, Ken-
nedy began to correspond with India's Prime Minister Nehru, 
asking him for suggestions and assistance while keeping the 
Prime Minister abreast of the . situation in Laos. The theme 
of these letters was a belief in a neutral Laos, but also a 
desire to see the Royal Lao retain predominance. In one let-
ter, Kennedy expressed this desire when he told Nehru that the 
•u.s. would never accept a coalition government that was domi-
nated by the Pathet Lao. 8 In effect, Kennedy did want a coali-
tion, but only one that would be pro-American. 
Alternatives 
Kennedy was able to gather support for the policy from 
administration personnel and members of Congress. The first 
recommendation on the Laos crisis, after Eisenhower, was from 
8 Kennedy to Nehru, Ma,rch 23, 1961. Box 111, National 
Security Files. 
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Senator Michael Mansfield. A former colleague in the Senate, 
the fellow Democrat sent a memorandum the day after Kennedy's 
inauguration. Mansfield was quite perceptive about the cir-
cumstances in Laos, citing the absurdity of an American policy 
that unilaterally provided military assistance to the Royal 
9 Lao government . . Another supporter of a neutral Laos was the 
American embassy in Laos, but this support, in essence, was 
clearly aligned with Kennedy's policy of a pro-American coa-
lition. In February, a State Department telegram from the 
embassy maintained support for a coalition government, but 
emphasized that the coalition's "composition should not be 
d h . . b. . 10 ma eat t e expense of political sta ility." A third source 
of support was Secretary of State Rusk. · Rusk stressed the idea 
of a neutral Laos, but believed that the Soviets should be 
made aware that this was the only alternative to a major 
military confrontation. 11 The implication here was that the 
U.S. was willing to talk, but also willing to fight over Laos. 
While some members of the administration advocated a 
policy of negotiations, other personnel called for a possible 
military solution. Kenneth T. Young, a member of the State 
Department, presented two separate reports on Laos to Kennedy. 
9Mansfield to Kennedy, January 21, 1961. Box 121, 
President's Office Files, John F. Kennedy Library Archives, 
Dorchester, Massachusetts. 
10 . b . . . American Em assy, Vientiane, to Washington, February 
14, 1961. Box 121, President's Office Files. 
11 . 7 Rusk to American Embassy, Moscow, March , 1961. 
President's Office Files, Box 121. 
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The first analysis, presented in November, 1960, was extremely 
militant in its makeup. This report was centered on the 
Southeast Asia region in general, and the Chinese Communists 
in particular. · Young agreed with Kennedy that "Red China (was) 
fast becoming the power that count(ed) in East Asia. 1112. 
According to Young, a strong stand by the administration in 
the re .gion was the only way to impress upon Peking that the 
. -U.S. was taking its commitments there seriously. The title of 
Young's report declared that this was a "new approach" to the 
problems of Southeast Asia. In reality, this approach was a 
compliment to the Eisenhower policy and consistent with the 
policy of containment. One example of this was Young's con-
tention that the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SE ATO) 
needed to be phased out and replaced with a multi-national 
. . · . 13 . . . 
military planning group. This was Young's interpretation 
of a "new approach". In actuality it was a continuation of 
the containment policy. This was the theme of the New Fron-
tier. 
In the spring of 1961, Young presented his second re-
port to Kennedy. This analysis dealt specifically with Laos. 
Although Young did not see the feasibility of war in Laos, he 
did retain .his hard line against Peking. To Young, the Chi-
nese still had to be made aware of the U.S. commitment to 
Laos. He maintained that the Soviets would have to prod the 
12Young to Kennedy, November, 1960. Box 121, President's 
Office Files. 
13
rbid. 
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. . 14 . Chinese to negotiate over Laos or leash Peking. Again, 
Young was in agreement with Kennedy as both saw the Chinese as 
the primary threat in Laos. Overall, this second report was 
not really different from the first. Both were hostile to 
Peking and each maintained the containment policy. 
Mc::;eorge Bundy was a member of the hard line group over 
- Laos. Bundy proposed that the U.S. needed to act in order to 
impress the Chinese, illustrating the American commitment · to 
15 the Royal Lao. Concurring with Young, Bundy saw SEATO as 
weak, outdated, and useless to the American effort in Laos. 
Bundy knew Kennedy did not want to appear weak over Laos and 
played up to this anxiety. Kennedy's fear would increase af-
ter the Bay of Pigs affair in April. If things continued to 
go poorly for the U.S. in world affairs, thought Kennedy, then 
the administration would find Peking willing to test the Ameri-
cans in Asia. 
Prior to the organization of the Geneva Conference, the 
administration prepared for the possible breakdown of the 
cease-fire. In May, 1961, a series of National Security Coun-
cil meetings were held to discuss the crisis and prepare for 
the possible introduction of American troops into the region 
near Laos. Kennedy made it clear to the members of the Coun-
cil that he was prepared to deploy troops into Laos as well 
14 Young to Kennedy, April, 1961. Box 121, President's 
Office Files. 
15Bundy to Kennedy, February 7, 1961. Box 121, President's 
Office Files. 
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as Thailand in order to contain the communist threat. 16 A 
second meeting consisted of a briefing by the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff on the subject of military alternatives in Laos. 
After hear~ng their report, Kennedy instructed them to continue 
planning such operations. 17 A third meeting was held on May 11 
and Kennedy declared to the Council that the U.S. would inter-
vene to prevent a communist Laos if the cease-fire broke or 
h . - 18 t e talks at r_;eneva fa i led. The conference at Geneva be-
gan five days later, with Kennedy remaining prepared to act 
with military force if necessary. 
Prior to the end of the Geneva Conference, Kennedy be-
gan to doubt that the nations would come to terms over Laos. 
In May, 1962, he professed a willingness to begin unilateral 
t . . . . b 19 opera ions in Laos if the cease-fire roke. In effect, Ken-
nedy was unwilling to take any chances on Laos, believing that 
his image would be ruined if the nation fell into the hands 
of the Pathet Lao. He wanted to make sure American interests 
were protected. In calling for elections in Laos, Kennedy 
maintained that they would only be held when it was certain 
that pro-American elements were in a position to defeat the 
16 · · · · 1 1961 National Security Council Meeting, May , . Box 
313, National Security Files. 
17National Security Council Meeting, May 4, 1961. Box 
313, National Security Files. 
18National Security Council Meeting, May 11, 1961. Box 
31~, National Security Files. 
19Nationa~ Security Council Meeting, May 24, 1962. Box 
33~, National Security Files. 
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communist forces in the elections. 2° Kennedy was willing to 
disregard democracy in return for a stable, pro-American gov-
ernment in Laos. 
Review of the Laos Policy 
The Kennedy policy in Laos was indicative of the admini-
stration's overall Asian strategy. Kennedy maintained "that 
with the rise of Communist power in China, combined with an 
expansionist, Stalinist philosophy .•. " there was a need to 
"contain the expansion of communism in Asia so we do not find 
. . . . . . . . 21 
the Chinese moving out into a dominate position in Asia. 
This was the core of the New Frontier, an active policy against 
the communist threat. 
Kennedy entered office faced with a situation in Laos 
that was polarized into right versus left, with the neutrals 
vacating the center to join the Pathet Lao. Much of the 
blame for this must be placed on Eisenhower, due to his re-
fusal to look for the neutral solution in Laos. Kennedy be-
lieved he had to act since his policy planners maintained that 
Laos was one of the four "roads" from China into Southeast ·Asia 
22 that had to be secured in order to maintain the status quo. 
ZOibid. 
21 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1963), John F. Kennedy, 1962. pp. 850~851. 
22 . . . . . . . America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American 
Relations, Edward Friedman and Mark Seldon, gen. eds., ( New 
York: Patheon Books, 1969), "The United States in Laos, 1945-
1962", by Jonathan Mirsky and Stephen Stonefield, p. 286. 
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. Rather than accepting a truly neutral Laos, Kennedy tended to 
maintain both the Cold War doctrine and the policy of Eisen-
hower. 
The administration's military plans were indeed form-
idable. The Navy's Seventh Fleet was placed on alert several 
times during 1961 and 1962 and troops were sent to Thailand. 
How far Kennedy was willing to go in Laos is a question open 
to debate. In October, 1961, the cease-fire in Laos was, at 
best, fragile. The Royal Lao, fearful . that the U.S. had de-
serted it, acted in a manner that sought to break the cease-
fire and disrupt the talks at Geneva. Kennedy insisted at the 
time that no matter how the cease-fire was broken, the U.S. 
. . . . . 23 
was going to intervene militarily. 
In May, 1962, Kennedy demonstrated how far he was willing 
to go in Laos. The Royal Lao had succeeded in breaking the 
cease-fire and crossed the cease-fire line. On May 12, Ken-
nedy accepted a Pentagon plan to act militarily since the 
cease-fire was now broken. The administration placed the 
blame on the Pathet Lao, thus rationalizing an American re-
sponse. The Pentagon plan recommended full support for the 
Royal Lao (the true perportrators of the crisis), and advo-
cated use of military force "including nuclear attacks on 
24 China" if necessary. The Pentagon did not want to be bogged 
23Mirsky and Stonefield, "The U.S. in Laos", p. 297. 
24Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 142-143. 
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down in an Asian war and to them, nuclear attacks were the 
best way to avoid this. 
By May 25, the crisis in Laos had passed and the cease-
fire was intact once again. The Geneva Conference ended in 
July and created a provisional government under the leader-
ship of Souvanna Phouma. However, U.S. troops remained in 
Thailand and played a tangible part in containing China. The 
administration had been willing to push the Laos crisis to 
the brink of nuclear war, despite the fact that its own al l y 
had caused the crisis. All of Kennedy's actions illustrated 
his preoccupation with containing China. 
India 
The American relationship with India, in terms of the 
China policy, was two-fold. In the first instance, India was 
to American leaders an example of the ability of "free" nations 
to succeed in Asia. The second phase of the relationship be-
gan in October, 1962, when the Chinese crossed the Indian 
borders. 
As a candidate for President in 1960, Kennedy used In-
dia as a means of comparing ~he free world to the Communist 
bloc, specifically t o Communist China. In a standard speech, 
the candidate presented India and China as contestants or com-
parable entities. To Kennedy, India illustrated "human dignity 
and individual freedom" while "Red China represent(ed) regi-
mented controls and (a) ruthless denial of human rights and 
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25 freedom. In another speech, Kennedy pointed out that India 
was a key nation in Asia and that the Nehru government would · 
counter Peking's threat to Asia by serving as a "pole", along 
. . 26 
with Japan, to balance the threat of communism. 
As a Senator, Kennedy had proposed a 1959 resolution that 
endorsed American support for India's five year economic plan. 
Again, Kennedy saw this as a way to surpass the Chinese who 
were also in the midst of a series of economic developments. 
The resolution asserted, "We want India to win that race with 
Ch . ,,27 ina. If India did not "win", Kennedy maintained, then 
the balance of power in Asia would shift against the United 
States. 
Despite Kennedy's policy of increased economic aid to 
India, the government of Jawaharlal Nehru remained basically 
neutral. In a way, India was a go-between for the Soviets 
and the Americans. Kennedy accepted India's neutrality, but 
refused to back away from trying to create a better relation-
ship with Nehru, hoping to eventually sway the Prime Minister 
to come into the American camp. In effect, this led to the 
increased economic aid and promises of military assistance if 
25 . . . University of New Hampshire Speech, March 7, 1960. 
Box 1030, Pre-Presidential Papers of John F. Kennedy, 
John F. Kennedy Library Archives, Dorchester, Massachusetts. 
26 .. Hawaii Speech, August 15, 1960. Box 6, Personal 
Papers of James C. Thomson Jr., John F. Kennedy Library 
Arctives, Dorchester, Massachusetts. 
27 h h . ( Artur M. Sc lesinger Jr., A Thousand Days New York: 
Fawcett Premier, 1965), p. 482. 
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Nehru requested it. However, by trying to induce Nehru with 
increased aid, Kennedy was beginning to hurt U.S. relations 
with Pa~istan. Kennedy was forced to walk a tightrope in 
his efforts , _ to contain China. 
The American ambassador to New Delhi was John Kenneth 
. Galbraith, the noted economist from Harvard. He too believed 
in trying to attract the Nehru government through increased 
economic aid. Together with Kennedy ; Galbraith hoped to bol-
ster the economy of India and keep it competitive with Peking. 
In turn, India would then provide the administration with a 
solid ally to help contain China. 
A major proponent of this policy was Chester Bowles. 
Bowles had been ambassador to India in the 1950's and he believed 
Nehru could help the administration as long as Kennedy did 
not try to force India to align with the U.S., suggesting, 
"We should not expect India to abandon its nonalignment pol-
icies, nor should we even attempt to press Nehru in this di-
. 28 2 . rection." In October, 196 , the Chinese would cross the 
border into India and solve this problem for Kennedy. 
Relations between China and India had been very poor 
since the rise of border skirmishes in 1959. The area in 
dispute was known as "pamir knot" and had historically been 
. 29 . 
an area of conflict. In December, 1961, India's Defense 
28 Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1971), p. 466. 
29 John Rowland, A History of Sino-Indian Relations (Prince-
ton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967), p. 156. 
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Minister, Krishna Menon, publicy stated that his nation would 
30 
reclaim its lost areas from .China "one way or another." 
Menon always believed India could expect the Soviets to be 
a deterrance to the Chinese and these remarks illustrated 
this belief. The Nehru government, trying to pressure Pekin g 
economically, abandoned a trade agreement between the two na-
tions. India also provoked China by establishin g outposts be-
hind the Chinese borders. In the early fall, Nehr u announced 
that these outposts would conduct sweeps of the area to re- · 
move Chinese. 
It is clear that these actions added to the existing 
tensions. Heavy fighting broke out in October and the Chi-
nese were on the offensive by November 15. Nehru's forces 
were clearly weaker than Peking's and the Indian leader put 
in an urgent appeal to Washington. 
Although the fighting came at the worst possible time 
(due to the proximity in time to the Cuban missile crisis), 
it did allow Kennedy to implement his plan for increasin g aid 
to India. Kennedy's willingness to come to India's aid a t this 
time was quite obvious. To temper this enthusiasm, Rusk in-
sisted that the U.S. "should in no way appear in a position of 
running after Nehru to offer aid, but rather to be responsi v e 
. . 31 . . 
as appropriate to his needs. The embassy in New Delhi agreed 
30 
· ' 322 Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. . 
3 1 · · 2 1 2 Rusk to American Embassy, New Delhi, October 0, 96 . 
Box 11, National Security Files. 
( 
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' with Rusk, as Galbraith emphasized that the U.S. would appear 
. b . . d 32 more controlled if Nehru's request was pu licize . 
It seems as though Kennedy needed to be restrained by 
Rusk and Galbraith. This was his first opportunity to ac-
tively confront the Chinese and he hoped to perform correctly. 
Yet Kennedy had to be restrained because of the delicacy of 
the situation. The Soviets and the Nehru government uere 
friendly and Kennedy had to be careful not to ant ug onize t he 
Russians who could then turn and assist the Chinese. The ot her 
delicate aspect of the crisis was Kennedy's position with Pa-
kistan. He could not appear as willing to arm India at the ex-
pense of India's arch-enemy. Fortunately for the administra-
tion, none of this occured. 
The reason China attacked when it did is open to de-
bate. Historically, the "pamir knot" had been an area of 
conflict and this may have simply have been just another out-
break over the region. Another reason could have been the 
provocation by India in the months pr eceding the hostili t ies. 
Finally, the fighting may have been a result of the Sino-
Soviet dispute. The Chinese may have been trying to inti-
. d h . b . . 33 mi ate t e Soviets y attacking India. For whatever reason, 
the Sino-Indian War helped Kennedy implement his containment 
policy against the Chinese. 
32 b . 2 2 . Gal raith to Rusk, October 9, 196 . Box 111, National 
Security Files. 
33 Rowland, A History of Sino-Indian Relations, p. 167. 
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Reflections 
The Laos crisis and the Sino-Indian War both forced 
Kennedy to come to terms with a concrete policy towards the 
Chinese Communists. Several months after the crisis in In-
dia, Kennedy described China as a "Stalinist regime ... deter-
mined on war as a means of bringing about its ultimate suc-
cess ..... 34 And Kennedy decided that the way to deal with 
this was through the policy of ·active containment. This 
was the epitome of the New Frontier. The Kennedy admini-
stration was not going to be bullied by the Chinese, ruther 
it was going to confront them. The policy was to confront 
China, hoping to maintain the status quo in Asia. 
34 
· ' 339 Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. . 
CHAPTER V 
THE FOOD CRISIS 
1962: The Pivotal Year 
To John Kennedy, 1962 was indeed the pivotal year for 
his policy towards the Chinese Communists. This was the 
year he · had to decide if he wished to take the initiative 
to bring about better communications . between Washington and 
Peking. The alternative was to maintain the existing policy 
and add stringent measures to combat the emerging Chinese. 
In the end, Kennedy chose to follow the old policy, increasing 
American involvement in Vietnam and trying to contain the 
Chinese Communists. 
1962 was a pivotal year for several other reasons. A 
year had passed since the administration first began to con-
template the China issue, allowing Kennedy the time to decide 
if he wanted to be more flexible towards Peking and taking the 
initiative. Secondly, the Cuban missile crisis and its re-
sults raised Kennedy's stock in the world. He was in a po-
sition of authority and could demand respect for ·any diplo-
matic step he took, including approaching the Chinese. A 
third reason marking the significance of 1962 was the state 
of Chinese development at the time. The administration was 
well aware of the Chinese nuclear program. The President 
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spoke publicly of his anxieties over the twin dangers of 
Chinese hostile policy and these weapons. In relation to 
this, after Cuba, Kennedy and Khrushchev spoke of the need 
to negotiate on arms control. Both were well aware of China ,' s 
potential in this area and each realized that any disarmament 
talks would have to include the Chinese to be significant 
and complete. 1962 also included Kennedy's private assur-
ances to administration officials that this was indeed the 
year for a change in attitude. 
Some of Kennedy's actions in 1962 have been discussed 
in the preceding chapter. In the next two chapters, the focus 
will be on two specific issues that reflected Kennedy's course 
of action, or rather inaction. The first will be on his 
policy towards shipments of food grain to the Chinese. The 
following chapter will deal with the 1963 Test Ban Treaty 
and how Kennedy looked to include .' the Chinese in the frame-
work of the agreement. Both issues will once again reflect 
the President's cautious and hesitant attitude towards Peking, 
bringing into question Kennedy's sincerity when he spoke of 
the need for a nawChiria policy. 
Factions Within 
After its first year in office, the Kennedy administration 
began to divide and form two solid factions in relation to 
the direction in which the China policy should proceed. On 
the one hand were the "liberals" in the administration. 
This group included Chester Bowles, Averell Harriman, and 
James c. Thomson Jr. The dominant faction, which maintained 
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the hard line against Peking, consisted of Dean Rusk, Walter 
Rostow. and Mc:George Bundy. Roger Hilsman, then Assistant 
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, fell some-
where in between the two groups, agreeing with each on re-
spective issues. Kennedy heard recommendations from each 
group, but it was obvious he listened and followed the hard 
line faction's suggestions, especially on the food issue 
and on containing the Chinese. 
To Offer or Not to Offer 
A major controversy within the administration in 1961 
and 1962 was over the question of offering food grains to 
the People's Republic which was then experiencing a tremen-
dous food shortage. The situation in China was caused by 
an expanding population while at the same time agricultural 
output was declining. ' 
The first recommendation to _ Kennedy came from George 
McGovern, Director of the Food for Peace Program. In May of 
1961, McGovern circulated a memorandum to the State Depart-
ment and the White House to make the administration more 
aware of the Chinese food crisis. McC; overn asked Bundy and 
Rostow to ask Kennedy to publicly affirm the availability of 
food in the U.S. that could b~ delivered to China. According 
to McGovern, this would "dramatically emphasize the humani-
tarian side'' of the administration and Kennedy himself. 1 
1 MC'Govern to Bundy and Rostow, May 24, 1961. Box 22, 
National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library Archives, 
Dorchester, Massachusetts. 
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This recommendation went directly to the heart of the issue. 
As Mct;overn put it, "the stark - fact is that millions of hu-
man beings are in misery while our storage facilities are 
filled with food we don't need." 2 This was something the 
hard line faction nor Kennedy could deny and M-o;overn was 
willing to illustrate the situation in cold, hard terms. In 
November of 1961, McGovern again sent a memorandum to the 
White House, asking for some action, claiming that "we are 
being besieged with letters favoring the shipment of grain 
to Red China." 3 Both memoranda underlined the seriousness 
of the crisis. 
An example of the letters received was one from the 
American Friends Committee on National Legislation. In 
December, this organization wrote the State Department, 
calling for the U.S. to "make a good faith offer quietly and 
without propaganda fanfare and leave the next move up to the 
. . 4 . . Chinese Communists." Letters such as this came predominate ly 
from church organizations and citizens who generally maintained 
to offer food was the just thing to do. 
The State Department joined the controversy in January 
of 1962 as Hilsman presented a report from the Department of 
2Ibid. 
3 McGovern to Rostow, November 28, 1961; Box 22, 
National Security Files. 
4American Friends Committee on National Legislation to 
State Department, December 20, 1961. Box 15, Personal Papers 
of James C. Thomson Jr., John F .. Kennedy Library Archives, 
Dorchester, Massachusetts. 
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Int~lligence and Research. Overall, the report recommended 
against offering food, but it also raised several strong 
reasons for offering food. The first of these points was 
that a U.S. offer _ would motivate the Chinese to question 
their own belligerent attitude towards the administration. 
A second motive for making the offer was that it would not 
isolate Peking after the Sino-Soviet split. Lastly, an offer 
of food would serve as a means to prevent the Chinese from 
contemplating a desperate push into Southeast Asia in search 
of food. 5 However, the report continued to assess the situation 
by listing the negative aspects. It estimated that the U.S. 
could not hope to attain a Chinese agreement on nuclear wea-
pons in return for the grain, nor would the Chinese refrain 
from their militant stance in Asia. 6 Hilsman believed that 
these negative aspects outweighed any good that could come 
from the food offer and thus recommended against it. 
Hilsman•s report failed to reveal the true · irnplications 
of this offer. The report asked too much from Peking, and 
once it estimated that returns would not be forthcoming, Hils-
man recommended against the offer. What Hilsman did not fore-
see - was the initial gains this offer could procure in opening 
up the relationship. 
Ten days after the Hilsman report, Chester Bowles countered 
S · 1 . 5 Hisman Report, January , 1962. Box 15, Personal 
Papers of James C. Thomson Jr. 
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with the first of many memoranda to the President on this 
issue. Bowles made the point th~t China's situation was not 
a temporary one, claiming that estimates saw the food deficits 
continuing for the next decade. Summarizing, this report em-
phasized that "it. se .ems clear that China will be increasingly 
7 forced to look to foreign growers for the necessary food." 
He believed China could do this in two ways: expansion of 
trade or military expansion into Southeast Asia. In contrast 
to Hilsman•s report, Bowles was optimistic over how an offer 
to the Chinese might encourage better relations between Peking 
and Washington. This memorandum correctly asserted that the 
U.S. should be willing to take the initiative on this issue. 
The last recommendation Bowles made once again countered Hils-
man because Bowles concluded that an offer of food might give 
the U.S. leverage over China, especially if the Sino-Soviet 
8 
split was as serious as thought. 
This report was more realistic and optimistic than Hils-
man•s. Bowles realized that the U.S. could not expect too 
much too soon. He knew that while an offer might not solve 
all problems, the administration had nothing to lose. 
A second Bowles report went to Kennedy in February. In 
this memorandum, Bowles again played on the anxieties of Ken-
nedy, stressing that the Chinese ~ould use military · expansion 
7Bowles to Kennedy, January 15, 1962. Box 113A, Presi-
dent's Office Files, John F. Kennedy Library Archives, 
Dorchester, Massachusetts. 
8 . Ibid. 
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to attain food if the situation remained desperate . 9 The 
theme of this recommendation was that the President could 
block this need to expand by offering food. This would pro-
tect U.S. interests in Southeast Asia and give Kennedy one 
less worry. In a way, a food offer would help "contain" the 
Chinese. 
Other members of the "liberal" faction were also beginnin g 
to pass along their recommendations. Averell Harriman, then 
Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Affairs, sent a memo-
randum to his superior, Rusk, in April of 1962. Harriman 
strongly favored offering food to Peking, basing most of his 
assumptions on the Bowle's information. Harriman made the 
point that the U.S. gave the Chinese ammunition to continue 
their belligerence every time the U.S. failed to act. 1O In 
other words, Harriman was advocating that the U .S. take the 
initiative here. The U.S. had the food, remaining the appre-
hensive party in the relationship. 
A third member of this faction who believed in taking 
the initiative was Bowles• assistant, Jame c. Thomson Jr. 
Thomson proposed that the U.S. should initiate discussion at 
the Warsaw Talks, a series of informal meet l ngs betw e en the 
People's Republic and the u.s. 11 Again, this would show the 
9 Bowles to Kennedy, February 6, 1962. Box 113A, Presi-
dent'd Office Files. 
1OHarriman to Rusk, April 13, 1962. Declassified April 
25, 1979.(Washington, D.C.: Carrollton Press, IncJ, Abstract 396-c. 
11Thomson to Bowles, May 14, 1962. Box 15, Personal Pa-
pers of James C. Thomson Jr. 
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Chinese that the U.S. was interested in bettering relations. 
In May of 1962, Hilsman offered another report, but this 
time with a change in tone. He was now ~eaning towards ·re-
cornrnending the offer, but was unsure how. Hilsman could not 
decided if a public or private offer was best. The important 
issue here is that Hilsman could now see the positive merits 
of an offer and how "it might well make it possible for other 
forces to bring about changes. 1112 
Before looking to the other faction, a discussion on 
Kennedy's perception of the problem is vital. The President 
was aware of the food shortage in Red China, with Bowles pro-
viding additional information. In January of 1961, at his first 
news conference, Kennedy made his initial statement on the 
is~ue, maintaining the U.S. would not use food as "propaganda 
. . 13 · d efforts" against the Chinese. As time went on, Kenney re-
mained skeptical, unwilling to make the first move or .take 
the ini tia ti ve on this or any other related issue. I<ennedy 
believed the Chinese had to act first. 
This was not Kennedy's first involvement with such a 
situation. In 1957, the question arose over sending food to 
Poland, a communist nation. As a member of the Senate at the 
time, Kennedy spoke out in favor of sending food. Kennedy 
maintained that "a considerable body of opinion would look 
12 ttilsman Report, Declassified November 7, 1979.(Wash-
ington, D.C.: Carrollton P~ess, Inc., 1980), Abstract 767-e. 
13
china and U.S., 1955-1963. Kwan Ha Yim, gen. ed., 
(New York:Facts on File, Inc., 1973), p. 145. 
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with favor upon an administration decision approving econo-
mic assistance to the people of Poland." 14 The Senator con-
tinued by emphasizing that the U.S. would at least demonstrate 
that it was willing to help "hungry and impoverished people." 15 
Five years later Kennedy would hear the same argument from 
McGovern, yet failed in the end to offer· food to the hungry 
and impoverished people of mainland China. 
On May 23, 1962, Kennedy told the press that it was up 
to Peking to ask for food, implying that he would not take 
the initiative. His statement concluded with, "I have said 
. 
from trebeginning, we would certainly have to have some idea 
as to whether food was needed ... up to the point, we have re-
. d . d' . 16 ceive no such in 1.cat1.on." Kennedy, ~ho had always main-
tained that the administration should keep the door ope q to 
the Chinese, refused to budge on this issue or any other. 
Rusk agreed with Kennedy on this issue. The Secretary 
of State believed the U.S. could not offer food without the 
a request from Peking, since it would appear as though the 
administration was rewarding the Chinese for being hostile. 
In June, 1962, at a meeting with Prime .Minister ~acmillan o f 
the United Kingdom, Rusk maintained that if the United States 
14 . . . 
--W1.ll1.am F. Knowland and John F. Kennedy-, "Should U .s. 
Give Aid to Communist Countries" Foreign Policy Bulletin 36 
(April 15, 1957): 117. 
15
rbid. 
16
china and U.S. Far East Policy, 1945-1967. (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1967), p. 112. 
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offered food, then the U.S. would be playing into the hands 
. 17 . 
of Peking. This gave Rusk the appearance of being a hard 
line advocate ih regard to China. Others, such as Rostow and 
Bundy, agreed with such assessments, recommending to Kennedy 
that he wait and see if Peking came to the u.s. first. 
Implications 
The Kennedy administration never made an offer to China . 
The chance to initiate better relations with Peking passed by 
untaken due to Kennedy's adherance to the hard line. The door 
which he often spoke of remained closed, keeping relations 
chilled. 
1962 closed with Kennedy pondering the future consequences 
of a hostile China in possession of nuclear capability. If 
Kennedy's fear was real, he should have seen the need to act 
when he had the chance. If Kennedy truly sought better re-
lations with Peking, then he had miss _ed a golden opportunity 
to take the initiative. If he had made an offer, it would 
have been a positive step towards a new China policy. 
17
state Department Memorandum, June 24, 1962. Box 15, 
Personal Papers of James c. Thomson, Jr. 
CHAPTER VI 
DISARMAMENT AND CHINA 
When John Kennedy was seeking the presidency, he spoke 
often about the need to make the world safer, citing the fact 
that nuclear weapons had increased tremendously in his politi-
cal lifetime. Although Kennedy ran on the theme of filling 
the fictional "missile gap", he was sincere in his hopes for 
beginning arms negotiations as President. 
In the early 1960's, England, the Soviet Union, and the 
United States possessed all the nuclear weapons in existence. 
In several years the Chinese and the French were expected 
to detonate their first nuclear devices. When this occurred, 
it would create the need to incorporate them into nuclear 
disarmament negotiations. The Kennedy adrqinistration - did 
try to bring in the French, but not the Chinese. Again, the 
President was short-sighted in his China policy. 
Kennedy Hopes 
When it came to the disarmament issue, the •Chinese Com-
munists were always on Kennedy's mind, but the issue never 
went beyond thought and into any form of action. In the 
summer of 1960, he expressed in a campaign speech the need 
to have a "flexible readiness for revision of the u.s. China 
policy" and suggested that the Chinese be included in a test 
-67-
-68-
ban treaty. 1 In September, he made the same assertion, but 
spoke of the need for the Soviets to discuss disarmament with 
Peking in order to illustrate to the Chinese that a "reduction 
in the pace of the arms race and a diminuation of threat of 
. 2 
war can be achieved." This statement, calling for the Soviets 
to deal with the Chinese, eventually became the Kennedy policy 
on disarmament. 
While Kennedy spoke of the need to seek arms control, 
future members of his administration were expressing criti-
cism of the Eisenhower policy on disarmament. These critics 
believed that the Republican administration took no steps to 
include the Chinese in the disarmameht process. Overall, the 
policy was seen as a "frozen, negative, and sterile" stance 
towards the Chinese. 3 After the election, these critics had 
their chance to improve on this policy, but failed to go be-
yond it. 
The Test Ban and China 
Chapter Three dealt with the issue of the Sino-Soviet 
split, an event that directly influenced disarmament. Ken-
nedy was well aware of the implications of the dispute from 
1 . . . . Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating With the Chinese Com-
munists (New York a Mc:Gra·w-Hill, 1968), p. 229. 
2
"Disarmament and Arms Control", September, 1960. Box 
993, Pre-Presidential Papers of John F. Kennedy, John F. 
Kennedy Library Archives, Dorchester, Massachusetts. 
3 . . 1 James C. Thomson Jr. to BenJamin Reed, September , 
1960. Box 993, Pre-Presidential Papers of John F. Kennedy. 
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various ~eports, analysis, and · recommendations he had received. 
The causes and effects were clinically broken down.and u.s. 
policy reflected these findings. In each of these reports 
there appeared a section on disarmament, something Kennedy 
either chose to read quickly or not at all. 
The CIA report of April, 1961 explored the relationship 
between the dispute and the path to disarmament. In this re-
port, the CIA concluded that Peking was wary of Khrushchev's 
policy of seeking detente with the u.s. The Chinese policy 
ran counter to this, for . China was seen by the CIA as un-
willing to join arms talks until it had obtained nuclear 
capability. 4 If the U.S. cooperated with the Soviets and 
agreed to negotiate, both Washington and Moscow would have to 
keep an isolated Peking in mind. 
It is interesting to note that a letter from Chiang 
Kai-shek was received by Kennedy on the same day as the CIA 
report. Its contents ran counter to the CIA report, stating 
• 
that the Peking regime would go along with Moscow on any dis-
armament agreement and that Kennedy did not have to deal di-
rectly with the mainland on this issue. 5 Obviously the General-
issimo was out to protect his own position by discrediting 
the significance of Peking's. 
4
cIA Rep _ort, April 1, 1961. Box 21, National Security 
Files, John F. Kennedy Library Archives, Dorchester, ~assa-
chusetts. 
5
chiang to Kenneqy, April 1, 1961. Box 113A, President's 
Office Files, John F. Kennedy Library Archives, Dorchester, 
Massachusetts. 
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Unfortunately, Kennedy accepted some of Chiang's hypo-
thesis. He was well aware of the significance of the Sino-
Soviet dispute and realized Peking was moving further away 
from Moscow's influence, especially on the issue of disarma-
ment. However, the administration refused to interpret this 
as a sign to take the initiative. There existed the need to 
at least attempt to induce the Chinese to negotiate. It may 
have been fruitless, but there was nothing to lose and all to 
gain. . Instead of trying this, Kennedy chose in .stead to rely 
on Moscow to influence Peking, something Chiang, as well as 
Kennedy, believed would suffice. A memorandum on the China 
policy, written just after the 1960 election, illustrated this 
idea, asserting that the Russians could and would restrain the 
. . . . 6 Chinese on nuclear weapons and convince Peking to negotiate. 
Kennedy once again illustrated his unwillingness to 
take the initiative. America had to act if it wanted to stop 
the deterioration of American-Sino relations. Peking could 
afford to wait and then negotiate after developing nuclear ca-
pability, giving them a bargaining chip against the United 
States. The ball was clearly in Kennedy's court. 
Perhaps Kennedy did not give the Chinese the respect 
they deserved. In 1963, at a State Dinner, the President 
remarked that he was worried about the future problems the 
Chinese presented, citing the threat the Chinese posed once 
6 State Department Memorandum, November, 1960. Box 14, 
Personal Papers of James C. Thomson Jr., John F. Kennedy 
Library Archives, Dorchester, Massachusetts. 
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they obtained nuclear weapons. For a fleeting moment the 
President of the United States sounded very much like a racist 
when he concluded his statement with "in the case of the Chi-
nese, it really doesn't matter, because the Chinese are per-
fectly prepared for nuclear war; because of their lower value 
of life, they are prepared to lose hundreds of millions if 
necessary." 7 
Following the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy began to 
acce~erate his plans for arms negotiations. The treaty, even-
tually signed by the Soviets and the Americans on July 25, 
1963, was an agreement banning all nuclear tests except under-
ground explosions. This agreement should not be denigrated 
as a limited and useless treaty. In reality, it was a first 
step between the super-powers. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev 
faced domestic criticism because of this treaty, but both 
should be applauded for taking this step, especially in light 
of this criticism. On the other hand, both should be cri-
ticized for looking to the other to solve the China issue. 
Kennedy hoped Khrushchev could assist him and make Peking 
see the need to negotiate. w. Averell Harriman, head of the 
U.S. delegat~on to the Vienna talks, was instructed by Ken-
nedy on the methods of hopefully attaining Khrushchev's co-
operation. The President reminded Harriman to keep China in 
mind while in Vienna and to stress the importance of this issue 
7
oral History Interview, William R. Tyler, Oral History 
Colledtion, John F. Kennedy Library Archives, Dorchester, 
Massachusetts. 
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to Khrushchev. Specifically, Kennedy believed Khrushchev 
had to "force China or try to force China to agree to a lim-
. 8 . ited test ban." Llwellyn Thompson, one time ambassador to 
the Soviet Union, believed Khrushchev agreed with Kennedy on 
the importance of China and disarmament, but .also believed 
that the Sino-soviet split had diminished any influence he 
had over Peking. In fact, Thompson maintained that Khrushchev 
was so disgusted with Peking that he did not care what China 
did. 9 Thompson's view was consistent with the CIA report and 
illustrates how important it was for an American initiative. 
If the soviets could not force China to sign an agree-
ment, Kennedy instructed Harriman to propose another method 
of possible control to Khrushchev. This prposal was to have 
the Soviets and the Americans attempt to hinder the Chinese 
developmental program. Kennedy instructed Harriman to ask the 
Soviet leader if this was possible. In effect, Kennedy 
wanted to know if there was some way the Chinese program 
10 
could be sabotaged. 
After the treaty was signed by the two delegations, 
Khrushchev and Harriman had the opportunity privately to dis-
cuss China. Acting on Kennedy's instructions, Harriman asked 
h . . . . . 11 . t e Soviet Premier if he could "deliver China." Harriman 
8 . . Oral History Interview, Llwellyn E. Thompson, Oral 
History Collect"ion, John F. Kennedy Library Archives. 
9 Ibid. 
lOibid. 
11Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days ( New York: 
Fawcett Premier, 1965), p. 829. 
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told Khrushchev that the U.S. intended to try and get France 
to sign the treaty. The Soviet leader simply told Harriman 
· 12 
that China was "your problem." 
The Horizon 
The test ban treaty was limited in several ways. It 
banned nuclear tests, except underground explosions, and 
failed to take into consideration potential nuclear nations. 
Kennedy and Khrushchev cannot be condemned for this, but they 
should be criticized for a lack of willingness to face up to 
the problem, especially in regards to the China question. 
Kennedy constantly spoke of the threat posed by Peking, 
but was too cautoius to try and alleviate the danger. He 
expected the Soviets to do his dirty work and, when Khrushchev 
refused, the work went undone. John Kennedy cannot be con-
demned for not obtaining the Chinese signatures on the treaty, 
but for not trying to obtain them. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the twenty years since his death, John F. Kennedy has 
been elevated to near sainthood by some biographers, friends, 
and the general public. Most people think that John Kennedy 
was an outstanding leader and President. This study is not 
concerned, however, with the personality of John Kennedy. This 
. 
image of Kennedy is mentioned because his fictional aura affects 
public conception of his policies. Twenty years have passed, 
allowing scholars to study Kennedy in an objecti_ve light, 
void of emotion and personal regard. This study has tried to 
reach that level of objectivity. 
Supporters of Kennedy claim that if he had lived, hi .s 
second term would have clearly illustrated the soundness of 
his policies. Statements such as these have made John Kennedy 
the "what if" President of the twentieth century. Some scholars 
prefer to paint a glorified picture of how the second term 
would have been more successful. This is fine if one is trying 
to write a best seller, but it does not fit the purpose of a 
scholarly investigation. The purpose of this study was not to 
forecast what might have been, but to look at Kennedy's record 
and analyze what did happen. 
What this record does show is t~at Kennedy was unwilling 
, 
to discard the ~xisting policy left to him by the previous 
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' administration. The Eisenhower policy, in general, worked 
to maintain the credibility of the Chinese.Nationalists while 
refusing to acknowledge the Chinese Communists. In 1960, many 
believed Kennedy would move away from this policy. These 
people believed this not because of evidence, but because of 
appearance. The theme of the New Frontier was a deceiving one. 
It gave the impression that Kennedy was going to be a president 
of action and purpose, which was true. However, the New 
Frontier also meant Kennedy was going to be an active leader 
against communism, leading to more stringent policies against 
the Chinese Communists. The difference .• in uges also led 
the people to see Kennedy as dynamic and willing to look be-
yond the existing policy. These conceptions of Kennedy would 
have .been different if people only took the time to look at 
his record. 
Kennedy matured in the immediate post-war years. Serving 
as both a Congressman and Senator, Kennedy was exposed to 
numerous individuals and political movements. The most unique 
individual and movement was Joseph McCarthy and McCarthyism. 
Kennedy and McCarthy shared an interesting relationship for 
several years. Kennedy's brother Robert worked on McCarthy's 
subcommittee and the Wisconsin Senator vacationed several 
times at the Kennedy estate on Cape Cod. The two men grew 
apart as McCarthy's investigations spread and eventually the 
friendship ended. The legacy of MCCarthyisrn stayed with Kennedy 
long after the friendship had ended, even as he entered the 
White House in 1961. 
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China had been a focal point of the McCarthy investigations 
and Kennedy, as President, remembered the scars they had left 
on members of the Truman administration. In 1960, emotions 
within the United States were mixed on China and Kennedy did 
not want to create any controversy. This partially led him to 
remain rigid and adhere to the Eisenhower policy. 
This rigid stance has been thoroughly documented in this 
study, especially in the chapters dealing with the United Na-
tions, containment, and disarmament. The U.N. policy was 
essentially the same as Eisenhower's, maintaining Taiwan, 
while working to postpone a vote on the admission of Peking. 
Containment remained a strong element of the China policy. 
Political, economic, and military assistance to Asian nations 
contributed to Kennedy's policy of surrounding the Chinese 
mainland with pro-American governments. Finally, in the 
area of disarmament, Kennedy acted as Eisenhower, unwilling 
to deal directly with the Chinese or take the initiative on 
this subject. 
The Eisenhower policy was maintained in response to real 
or imagined opposition. Kennedy feared his administration 
was being closely scrutinized by several movements in regards 
to the China issue. The first movement was the China Lobby. 
In all fairness to Kennedy, this was a formidable barrier to 
a new policy, but the degree of trouble it could have caused 
is debatable. The point is that the longer Kennedy allowed 
this movement to influence him on this issue, the harder it 
was going to be to change the policy in the future. 
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The second movement that confronted Kennedy was Congress. 
In general, the Congress was conservative on the China issue 
and looked to maintain the status quo. Again, this was a 
force that Kennedy had to deal with if he wanted to change 
the American policy. 
The last movement that Kennedy feared was public opinion. 
However, in comparison to the China Lobby and Congress, Kennedy 
clearly over-estimated the sentiment of the American electorate. 
Surveys discussed in earlier chapters have illustrated this 
point. Kennedy constantly maintained that he needed to mo-
bilize public support for his policy, yet he already had it. 
In the end, he actually mobilized support against China. A 
series of surveys pone by the American Institue of Public 
Opinion demonstrated that Kennedy, by constantly criticizing 
Peking as the major threat to world peace, convinced the elec-
torate of this. In 1961, only 32 percent believed th _is, but 
by 1964, 56 percent had the impression that China posed the 
greatest threat to the United States. 1 In essence, Kennedy 
mobilized support for the existing policy, allowing him to 
maintain it. 
With Kennedy's death came the end of his administration 
but not the end of the China ~olicy. During his tenure Ken-
nedy missed the chance to create better relations with the 
Chinese Communists. Although it is safe to say the relationship 
1 . . Gerry Ruth Sack Tyler, "A Contextual Analysis of Public 
Opinion Polls: The Question of Admission of Communist China to 
the United Nations" Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1972, 
p. 131. 
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would not ·have completely thawed, but progress could have 
been made towards more conciliatory relations. Specifically, 
Peking would not have been isolated from the U.S. and there 
was the potential for nuclear negotiations. Also, by keeping 
the door open to a better relationship, Kennedy would have 
kept the Chinese more involved in international issues. How-
ever, by adhering to the old policy, he tended to isolate the 
Chinese at the expense of seeking better international coopera-
tion. 
SOURCE NOTES 
· The primary sources proved to be the vital are-a of the 
investigation and an introduction to them is necessary in 
order to acquaint the reader with their nature. 
The Oral History Collection at the Kennedy Library wus 
used as a ~eans of trying to come to terms with the admini-
stration's policy as a whole. I was able to read numerous 
interviews and this allowed me to come to some sort of a co n-
clusion. It is important to remember that each interview was 
not taken as gospel truth, but instead I tried to use the inter-
views as a guide to the administration's policy. 
Kennedy's Pre-Presidential Papers were used to see how 
and if his thoughts on China had chanyed over the lenyth of 
his tenure in office. The Stevenson Report of 1960 and various 
speeches were the best documents in these files. 
The National Security Files provided an insiyht on the 
National Security Council and the administration's policy, 
especially on the crisis in Laos. Memorandum from .McGeorc,;e 
Bundy was a l so prevalent in these files and gave an indica-
tion of Kennedy's personal views. Th is was the case also 
with the President's Office Files. 
The Personal Papers of Hilsman and .Thomson presented a 
wide range of documents. Each man also included '.~hd.sr own 
analysis of policy that I used in order to compare to public 
statements. In general, I used all these documents so that 
I did not have · to rely on a secondary source for analysis. By 
persona lly studying these documents, I was able to come to my 
own conclusions. 
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